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V1 
CHAPTER! 
1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
. 1.1. INTRODUCTION 
T\le general definition of an efficient market is a market where security prices 
fully reflect all publicly available information. Jensen (1978) elaborates further that a 
market is efficient with respect to a particular set of information if it is impossible to 
make economic profits, on average, by trading on the basis of that information set. , 
Generally, the evidence is consistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) and is generally accepted by researchers as descriptive (Watts and 
Zimmemian 1986). There is empirical evidence however that sometimes contradicts the 
EMH. These anomalies are typically illustrated by showing that an abnormal return can 
· be earned by using publicly available information. 
Two related anomalies regarding ·accruals (hereafter, collectively referred to as 
the accrual anomaly) have recently been documented by researchers. One stream of this 
research demonstrates that the market misprices the accrual component of earnings 
relative to its persistence [Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Collins and Hribar (2000), 
Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001)]. 1 A closely related stream of research 
documents the market's mispricing of discretionary versus nondiscretionary accruals 
[Subramimyain (1996), Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996), Xie (1999)]. Regarding these 
two anomalies, researchers have shown that the market misprices the discretionary 
1 Sloan (1996) shows that the extent to which current earnings pe~ormance persists into the future is 
dependent on the relative magnitudes of the cash and accrual components of current earnings. Due to the 
nature of accrual accounting, at some future point the accruals must reverse, causing a subsequent decrease . 
in earnings. Whereas, the portion of current earnings attributable to cash flows does not subsequently 
reverse. Thus, firms should be priced according to not only the level of current earnings, but also based on 
the relative accrual and cash flow components thereof. · 
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accrual, nondiscretionary accrual, and cash flow components of earnings relative to their 
implications on future earnings. The accrual anomaly is evidence that investors ignore the 
components of earnings when making investment decisions. The accrual anomaly 
indicates that items of publicly available information (i.e., the relative components of 
earnings) are not correctly impounded into security prices. In other words, the market is 
inefficient. Sloan (1996) states that investors become "fixated" on the level of current 
earnings without considering the impact the cash flow and accrual components will have 
on future earnings. An important implication. of the accrual anomaly is that firms can 
manage earnings through the use of discretionary accruals and "fool" investors. 
A possible explanation for the accrual anomaly is that the model used to classify 
total accruals into the discretionary and nondiscretionary parts is misspecified. 
Discretionary accrual models are often used in investigations of earnings management. 
Generally, researchers hypothesize that earnings are managed in predictable ways by 
using discretionary ac~ruals. Discretionary accrual models estimate the discretionary 
accruals used by firms to manage earnings·(Thomas and Zhang 2000). ·Typically, models 
of discretionary accruals estimate discretionary accruals by comparing actual total 
accruals with estimated total accruals derived with an accrual prediction model. The 
for~cast errors from the discretionary accrual model are assumed to represent 
discretionary accruals. Thus, forecast accruals are assumed to represent 
nondiscretionary accruals (Le., the accruals that would be present absent any incentives to 
manage earnings). 
The model used most frequently to accomplish this task is the Jones (1991) 
model. Although the Jones (1991) model is extensively used in the earnings management 
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literature and it may be the best currently available alternative for separating total 
accruals into the discretionary and nondiscretionary components, it lacks power (Bernard 
and Skinner 1996). As Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) point out, norie of the 
currently available models of discretionary accruals work very well at identifying 
discretionary accruals. 
This research study addresses two areas related to the accrual anomaly. First, this 
research set out to develop an improved discretionary accrual model. Second, the 
· research attempts to better understand how the market prices the components of current 
earnings (i.e.,.discretionary accruals, nondiscretionary accruals and cash flows) in order 
to better understand the accrual anomaly and its implications for market efficiency and 
earnings management. 
1.1.1 Improved Model of Discretionary Accruals 
One possible explanation for the poor performance of the Jones (1991) model 
may be that nonstationarities in the data used to· predict accruals are causing errors in the 
estimates of discretionary accruals. Regression analysis of time-series data is usually 
based on the assumption that the regression relationship is constant over time. In some 
instances, the validity of this assumption is open to question, and it is often desirable to 
examine it critically, particularly if the model is to be used for forecasting (Brown, 
Durbin, and Evans 1975). Statistical procedures are available that allow testing of the 
time-series of observations for periods of nonstationarity. These techniques, contained in 
the TIMV AR program developed by Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975), are effective in 
identifying periods where time-:series data become unstable .. By removing the periods 
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where the structures of the regression relationships are unstable, the estimates of 
nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals will be more accurate. Further, the Jones 
(1991) model has a weakness in that it assumes that discretionary accruals are zero during 
the estimation period of the model (Thomas and Zhang 2000). If there is management 
discretion in the estimation period of the model, which there most sure!y is it\ many 
firms, the Jones ( 1991) model actually predicts unexpected accruals and its estimates of 
discretionary accruals contain Some discretionary accruals and some nondiscretionary 
accruals. 
The development an improved model was accomplished by applying the 
techniques of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) to a hypothetical data set. The 
hypothetical (or "maqe up") data was .created allowing for the manipulation of various 
accounting choices. Model development proceeded by testing the impact on the accuracy 
of the model by introducing managerial discretion that resulted in nonstationary periods 
in the hypothetical data to determine whether the variables have the ability to predict 
discretionary accruals in a defined data set, where the amounts are known; The accuracy 
of the estimates of discretionary accruals of the stationary Jones model were compared to 
the accuracy of the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the original Jones 
(1991) model. 
A better specified model of discretionary accruals is very useful to academic 
researchers. There is a large body of accounting research that relies on the measurement 
of accruals (Collins and Hribar 2000). 
"This literature includes studies on the relative informativeness or value 
relevance of cash flows versus accruals [Rayburn (1986), Wilson (1987), 
Dechow (1994)], tests of earnings management and income smoothing 
[e.g., Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986, 1988), Jones (1991}, Dechow, Sloan 
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and Sweeney (1995), Rees, Gill and Gore (1996), DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), and Rangan 
(1998)], the pricing of discretionary versus nondiscretionary accruals 
[Subramanyam (1996), Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996), Xie (2001)], and 
the market's mispricing of accruals [Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Collins and 
Hribar (2000)] (Collins and Hribar 2000 p. 2)." 
No single model of discretionary accruals has gained acceptance among 
researchers as being sufficiently descriptive. A model that more accurately captures 
management's discretionary accruals will give researchers greater insight as to how 
companies adjust earnings to satisfy the market. Further, improved estimates oftlie 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components of total accruals will be useful in the 
above-cited streams of research. 
1.1.2 The Accrual Anomaly · 
The second component of this research examines the pricing of discretionary 
accruals, nondiscretiona.ry accruals, and the cash flow components of earnings in order to . 
better understand the ~ccrual anomaly and its implications for market efficiency. An 
evaluation of the market's pricing of the components of earnings was made using both 
the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
When a p~operly specified model of discretionary accruals is used, jt was determined that 
the market is, in fact, more sophisticated than previous studies have indicated in that 
discretionary accruals, nondiscretionary accruals and cash flows are indeed effectively 
evaluated for their implications for future earnings. Even if firms manipulate 
discretionary accruals to inflate current earnings, the market should price the stock of the 
firm accordingly since these discretionary accruals have been shown to be less persistent 
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than the other components of earnings (Sloan 1996, Xie 2001). The pricing of the 
components of earnings is tested with the Mishkin (1983) test and by forming hedge 
portfolios based on relative discretionary accruals. 
The accrual anomaly is of particular interest to accountants because it concerns 
. how the market uses accounting information in valuing securities. The· accrual anomaly 
represents a phenomenon where investors do not understand the financial reporting of 
firms. It also implies that it is possible for firms to manipulate earnings and fool 
investors. If research continues to indicate that the accrual anomaly exists~ it may be · 
indicative of a fundamental flaw in the current accounting model, requiring attention by 
standard setters. In order to mitigate these problems, it may be necessary for standard 
setters to reduce the subjectivity allowed to companies in making their discretionary 
accruals. If the research finds that the accrual anomaly disappears when an improved 
model of discretionary accruals is employed, then the _current financial 'reporting model 
I 
would appear to be valid, at least with respect to accrual accounting. 
1.2. RE~EARCH QUESTION 
The specific research questions addressed are: Does the Jones (1991) model produc~ 
more accurate estimates of discretionary accruals if nonstationary periods that may or 
may not be.the result of management discretion are removed from the estimation period 
of the model? Do investors correctly price discretionary accruals according to their 
persistence? 
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1.3. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
The question of why managers choose to manipulate reported earnings is important 
for at least two re~sons. First, financial statement users are interested in how to interpret 
financial statements that have been produced using discretionary accruals - how do 
discretionary accruals affect the informativeness of financial statements? Second, 
standard setting bodies tend to reduce the discreti~n available to companies in reporting, 
based on the assumption that managers exercise their discretion opportunistically. If 
managers use their discretion to increase the informativeness of accounting earnings, then 
standard setters may wish to rethink their current approach (Bernard and Skinner 1996). 
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CHAPTER2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUAL MODELS 
It is important for accounting researchers to understand the impact of public 
financial reporting on the users of that information. One avenue to understanding· the 
effect on users is to.study the reaction of the market to particular accounting numbers. 
One facet of accounting reporting is that there is flexibility allowed to management in the 
treatment of various accounting rules. This allows managers to have some flexibility 
through the use of discretionary accruals. 
There are two possible reasons that managers may use discretionary accruals, one 
self-serving and the other as a means of signaling. The first reason is that accruals are 
good indicators of possible future cash flows for the firm. According to this reasoning, 
accruals are a more reliable and timely measure of firm performance (i.e., earnings) than 
cash flows. According to Subramanyam (1996), one possible reason management uses 
accruals is to improve the ability of earnings to reflect the value of the firm. Another 
possibility is that managers use accruals oppo.rtunistically to hide poor performance or to 
postpone a portion of unusually good performance into future years. 
Tests of earnings management and market efficiency using discretionary accruals 
are widespread in accounting research (Kothari, Leone and Wasley 2001). However, it 
. has been discovered that the current models being used to estimate discretionary accruals 
lack proper specification and power (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995). Unfortunately, 
there has been little s~ccess in improving the models used to estimate discretionary 
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accruals. In spite of this, the discretionary accrual models identified as misspecified 
continue to be used (Kothari, et al. 2001 ). 
2.1.1 Jones (1991) Model 
The purpose ofdiscretionary accrual models, such as the Jones (1991) model, is 
to allow researchers to separate the total accrual component of earnings into the 
discretionary and nondiscretiohary components. The Jones (1991) model accomplishes 
this task by assuming that nondiscretionary accruals are relatively stable over time, and 
that discretionary accruals tend to vary. The Jones (1991) model does allow 
nondiscretionary accruals to vary with the economic circumstances of the firm .. 
Therefore, nondiscretionary accruals become a function of firms' change in revenue and 
the level of property, plant, and equipment. Researchers then estimate the Jones (1991) 
model in time series, and use the forecasted values to estimate the nondiscretionary 
accruals. The estimated discretionary accruals then fall out as the prediction error.2 
Jones began development of her model by extending the expectations model of 
DeAngelo (1986). DeAngelo was interested in conflicts of interest resulting from 
management buyouts of public stockholders. She hypothesized that mangers would use 
their managerial discretion over accruals to systematically understate net income when 
the firm was about to engage in a management buyout of the stockholders' interests. By 
decreasing earnings, managers would be able to obtain a purchase price for the 
outstanding shares below what would have otherwise been acceptable if earnings had 
been higher. She investigated the accounting decisions made by 64 firms publicly traded 
2 There are also variants of the Jones (1991) model. For instance, one variant estimates discretionary 
accruals cross sectionally based on two-digit SIC Code. 
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on the New York and American Stock Exchanges that proposed management buyouts 
' 
during 1973-1982. DeAngelo found no empirical results that indicated that managers of 
firms proposing management buyouts were systematically understating.earnings. 
To test her hypotheses, DeAngelo tested whether average abnormal accruals were. 
significantly negative for the periods immediately prior to the management buyout. In 
the DeAngelo (1986) model, total accruals from a prior period (t- k) are used as a 
measure of the "normal" total accrual. Abnormal total accrual is defined as the 
difference between current total accruals and the estimated normal total accruals, 
allowing total accruals to be separated into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals: 
where: 
ATAit = (TAit ..c.TAit-k) = (DAu-DAit-k)+(NAit-NAit-k) (1) 
T Ait = total accruals in year t for firm i; 
DAit = discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; 
NAit = nondiscretionary accruals in year t for firm i; 
T At-k = total accruals in year t-k for firm i; 
DAit-k = discretionary accruals in year t-k for firm i; 
NAit-k = nondiscretionary accruals in year t-k for firm i; 
The DeAngelo (1986) model assumes that the average change in nondiscretionary 
accruals, (NAit - NAit-k), is approximately zero, so that a change in total accruals, (TAit -
TAt-k), is due to a change in discretionary accruals, (DAit -DAit-k). 
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Jones (1991) was also interested in earnings management. She tests whether 
firms that would benefit from import relief (e.g., tariff increases and quota reductions) 
attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief 
investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).' One factor 
looked by the ITC at when making decisions whether to provide import relief is the 
earnings of the firms that would benefit from the relief provisions. This provides 
incentives for managers to manage earnings down in order to increase the likelihood of 
obtaining import relief and/ or increase the amount of relief granted (Jones 1991 ). 
Jones finds support for her hypotheses indicating that firms make income-
. . . 
decreasing accruals during import relief investigation._ However, Jones' greatest 
contribution to the literature was her improvements in the estimation_ of discretionary 
accruals from DeAngelo (1986). Use of the DeAngelo (1986) model assumes that the 
difference between current- and prior-year accruals is due solely to changes in 
discretionary accruals because nondiscretionary accruals are assumed to be constant from· 
period to period. To relax this assumption, Jones includes variables in the model to 
allow for changes in the economic circumstances of the firm. Jones includes the change 
in revenues (MIBV) and gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) in order to control 
for changes in nondiscretionary accruals caused by changing economic conditions. Jones 
estimates the following weighted generalized least squares model: 
TAit I Ait-1 = a; [1 / Ait-1] + Pu [ARE~, I Ait-1] + P2; [PPEit I Ait-1] + &it (2) 
where: 
TAt = total accruals in year t for firm i; 
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AflEYit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; 
An-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
En = error term in year t for firm i; 
i = 1, ... , N firm index 
t = 1, ... , T year index for the years included in the estimation period for firm i. 
The reasoning for including .the change in revenues (AflEYit) is because total 
accruals (T An) includes changes in working capital accounts, such as accounts receivable, 
inventory, and accounts payable, that fluctuate to some extent on changes in revenues. 
According to Jones, revenues are used as a control for these changes because revenues 
are an unbiased endogenm,1s measure of firms' performance that are not subject to 
managers' manipulations .. The level of property, plant, and equipment is included to 
control for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. 
Gross PPE is used in the model, as opposed to the change in PPE, because it is total 
depteciation expense, as opposed to the change in depreciation, that is included· in total 
accruals (Jones 1991}. To reduce the problems associated with heteroscedasticity, a 
weighted or generalized least squares estimation procedure is used thus forcing all of the 
error terms to have the same variance. Lagged assets (An-1) are used to scale all of the· 
variables in the expectations model. Lagged assets are assumed to be positively 
correlated with the variance of the error term (Jones 1991). 
Jones uses generalized least squares (GLS) to obtain parameter estimates ai, bli, 
and b2i of a.i, 13 u, and l32i, respectively. The Jones ( 1991) model assumes that the 
12 
relati(mship between nondiscretionary accruals and the explanatory variables is 
stationary. Prediction error is defined as: 
where p = year index for years included in the prediction period. The level of 
discretionary accruals is represented by the prediction error, Uip-
Jones estimates the model using the longest time-series of observations available. 
Use of the Jones ( 1991) model to estimate nondiscretionary accruals in time series over 
long periods is problematic. Using long time-series of observations improves estimation 
efficiency, however it increases the likelihood that structural changes may occur during 
the estimation period. These nonstationarities can result in measurement error in both 
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. This measurement error may lead 
to questionable results for any research utilizing this model to investigate the pricing of 
these two components of total accruals. 
Another probable weakness of the Jones (1991) model is that it assumes there is 
no managerial discretion in the estimation period of the model. The variables in the 
Jones (1991) model are included to control for nondiscretionary changes in accruals due 
to exogenous factors. Ifthere is discretionary manipulation of accruals during the 
estimation period of the model, the model cannot accurately predict total 
nondiscretionary accruals for the test/forecast period and the estimates of discretionary 
accruals will be wrong. 
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2.2 ACCRUAL ANOMALY 
Sloan (1996) documents an anomaly to market efficiency. Sloan (1996) 
investigates the extent to which stock prices reflect information contained in _the accrual 
and cash flow components of current earnings. Sloan first demonstrates that the extent to 
which current earnings performance persists into the future is dependent upon the relative 
magnitudes of the cash and accrual components of current earnings. Investors in an 
efficient market should recognize this relationship between accruals, cash flows and 
earnings, and price those firms with a relatively large portion of their earnings deriving 
from accruals accordingly. Those firms with earnings that are made up of relatively large 
amounts of accruals versus actual cash flows from operations may be using accrual 
accounting to manipulate their earnings. 
Sloan finds that investors do not distinguish between the accrual and cash flow 
components of current earnings until that information impacts future earnings. He 
demonstrates that if one were to invest long (short) in firms in the bottom (top) decile of 
relative accruals, one would generate positive abnormal returns over the succeeding 
years. Sloan's interpretation is that the market becomes "fixated" on the level of current 
earnings without considering the accrual and cash flow components. The implication is 
that firms can manage earnings through the use of accruals, but that the market is so 
gripped by the level of total earnings that it is unable to distinguish between the cash 
component and the accrual component, even though the accrual component is less 
persistent. This is not the result one would expect in an efficient market. If all publicly 
available information is impounded into securities' prices, then the relative makeup of 
earnings should be impounded into the price. Those firms with earnings that consists of 
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relatively large (small) amounts of accrual income should be priced lower (higher) than 
those firms whose earnings consist of relatively large ( small) amounts of cash flows. 
The accrual anomaly has been addressed more recently by Xie .(2001). Xie 
studies the relationship between normal accruals, abnormal accruals3, and cash flows 
from operations. Whereas Sloan assumes that relatively large amounts of total accruals is 
an indication that firms may be managing earnings, Xie posits that some accruals are 
necessary, and that the best indicator of earnings management is relatively large amounts 
of abnormal or discretionary accruals. For example, firms have a substantial degree of 
discretion in the amounts booked for bad debt expense, however they have very little 
discretion over accrued wages. The amount of accrued bad 'debt expense is very 
subjective while the amount of accrued wages expense is not. Consequently, since 
managers have the ability to manipulate earnings through discretionary ~ccruals, the 
market should price these discretionary accruals differently than the nondiscretionary 
accrual and the cash flow components of current earnings. 
Xie uses the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals to discriminate between 
-discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. Xie finds that the market 
overestimates the persistence of discretionary accruals and consequently overprices those 
accruals. In other words, Xie finds that the market is inefficient with respect to 
discretionary accruals in that the market fails to differentiate between the components of 
current earnings and the implications that those components have on future earnings. 
3 There is disagreement among the terminology used by researchers in describing the results of the Jones 
(1991) model. Xie (2001) terms the estimates as "abnormal accruals" where other researchers have called 
the estimates "discretionary accruals". Accrual prediction models forecast total accruals. The forecast 
errors from the model are deemed to be discretionary accruals by some researchers and "unexpected 
accruals" by others. 
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Possible explanations for the anomalous findings discussed above are: 1) the 
market is inefficient with respect to the components of earnings and/or 2) the models and 
tests used to test the accrual anomaly are misspecified. Even though it is widely believed . 
that firms manage earnings using discretionary accruals, if the market is efficient in the 
semi-strong form, those discretionary accruals should be priced differently than the 
nondiscretionary accrual component of earnings. 
The accrual anomaly may be the result of using a discretionary accrual model that 
produces inaccurate estimates of the amount of discretionary accruals. A key issue in the 
tests. of the accrual anomaly is how well the model classifies total accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Bernard and Skinner 1996). Healy 
(1996) points out that power and internal validity of tests of discretionary accruals. 
depend critically on whether the discretionary accrual models used in studies are well 
specified. The model that is used most extensively to separate accruals into discretionary 
and.nondiscretionary components is the Jones (1991) model. Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) analyze five commonly"".used models of discretionary accruals and 
conclude that the Jones (1991) model outperforms all others. Dechow, et al. and Guay, 
Kothari and Watts (1996) indicate that none of the models of discretionary accruals 
effectively detects earnings management since they lack sufficient power.· A more robust 
discretionary accrual model is needed to study the accrual anomaly. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The study of accruals is important to the discipline of accounting. The profession 
has chosen to allow for flexibility in reporting with the intention of providing more useful 
information. In order for financial reporting to convey meaningful information, financial 
16 
accounting standards must allow mangers to exercise judgment in their financial 
reporting (Healy and Wahlen 1999). This allows managers to use their knowledge about 
the business and its opportunities to use some discretion in the selection of reporting 
methods, estimates and disclosures that match the firm, which increases the value of 
accounting information to convey useful information. However, this judgment also 
provides opportunities for "earnings management," where managers use their discretion 
in self-serving ways, which does not accurately reflect the firms' underlying true value 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
According to the former Chairman of the· Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Arthur Levitt, earnings manage~ent can have a serious effect on resource 
allocation. He noted that the credibility of financial reporting is being threatened by 
management accounting abuses such as "big bath" restructuring charges, premature 
revenue recognition, "cookie jar" reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process 
research and development charges (1998). Healy and Wahlen define earnings 
management as the occurrence wherein management uses judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the true underlying economic conditions of the firm or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (1999). 
It is important to examine how users of accrual accounting information 
. understand what is being reported. Insight can be gained as to whether users comprehend 
accrual accounting by determining whether they price accruals according to their 
persistence. The accrual· anomaly implies that the market does not price accruals 
efficiently, and thus, the market does not understand accrual accounting. Possible 
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explanations for the anomalous result should be investigated. If the accrual anomaly is 
possibly the result of a poorly specified discretionary accrual model, then researchers 
should investigate the model and the anomaly further. 
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CHAPTER3 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUAL MODELS 
3.1.1 Nonstationarity 
The Jones (1991) model is an accrual prediction model. It estimates discretionary 
accruals by making a prediction of total accruals for a test/forecast period. The 
prediction of total accruals is compared to the actual accruals for the test period. and any 
difference is deemed attributable to managerial discretion. To make predictions of total 
accruals, the Jones ( 1991) is estimated using a weighted least squares estimation 
procedure over the longest time series of observations available prior to the test period. 
Using a long time series of observations can improve estimation efficiency but it can also 
be problematic due to possible structural shifts in the. data. These structural shifts can 
cause the· estimates of total accruals provided by the model to be inaccurate and thus the 
estimates of discretionary accruals will also be inaccurate. Removing the structural shifts 
should improve the Jones (1991) model's ability to accurately estimate discretionary 
accruals. Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) develop techniques contained in the 
TIMV AR program that are useful at identifying structural shifts in time-series data for 
the purpose of improving the forecast accuracy of models that use such data. 
3.1.2 Unexpected Accruals Versus Discretionary Accruals 
As Thomas and Zhang (2000) point out, the Jones (1991) model really makes a 
prediction of unexpected accruals, not discretionary accruals. Total accruals for firm i in 
year t consists of two elements, discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. 
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(4) 
Discretionary accrual models, such as the Jones (1991) model, predict total accruals 
(T At), which is the sum of the forecasted values of nondiscretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. The forecast error (FEit) from the model is then viewed as the 
discretionary accruals. However, the forecast error is actually the sum of the forecast 
errors on the two components of total accruals. 
(5) 
However, the researcher only observes total·accruals. Prior research has assumed 
that discretionary accruals are insignificant in the estimation period, and the model is in 
effect derived for only nondiscretionary accruals. Consequently, the forecast error is 
viewed as a reasonable estimate for discretionary accruals. If discretionary accruals exist 
in the estimation period, the model is actually predicting unexpected accruals because the 
predictable portion of both discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals is captured in the 
forecast (Thomas and Zhang 2000). Accordingly, an improved model of discretionary 
accruals that takes into account any possible managerial discretion during the estimation 
period of the model is needed to overcome the fact that prediction error from the Jones 
( 1991) model actually represents unexpected accruals and not total discretionary accruals. 
Managerial discretion during the estimation period of the model results in a structural 
shift in the time-series data. These structural shifts are identified and removed from the 
20 
estimation of the model, thereby eliminating managerial discretion during the estimation 
period. With managerial discretion removed from the estimation period of the model, the 
model then is providing more accurate estimates of discretionary accruals during the test 
period. 
3.1.3 Discretionary Accrual Model Hypothesis Development 
Nonstationarity is likely causing significant measurement error in the estimates of . 
discretionary accruals provided by the Jones (1991) model.4 These measurement errors 
cause results achieved from research using the Jones (1991) model to be suspect. By 
removing the nonstationary periods from the estimation period with the TIMV AR 
program ofBrown, Durbin and Evans (1975) when using the Jones (1991) model, more 
accurate estimates of discretionary accruals should be achieved. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis (stated in the null) is tested. 
H1: The estimates of discretionary accruals generated by the stationary 
Jones model are more accurate than the estimates of discretionary 
accruals generated by the Jones (1991) model. 
3.2 ACCRUAL ANOMALY HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Formerly, tests of the accrual anomaly have been joint tests of the accrual 
anomaly and on the ability of the discretionary accrual model to bifurcate accruals into 
the discretionary and nondiscretionary parts. As Healy (1996) points out, tests of the 
· accrual anomaly are difficult to interpret because they are joint tests of the market 
efficiency with respect to discretionary and nondiscretionary earnings and of the capacity 
4 The nonstationarity may or may not be the result of managerial discretion. 
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of the accrual model to separate the accrual component of earnings into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals. 
An improved model of discretionary accruals will allow more appropriate 
assessment of the market's pricing of discretionary accruals and understanding of the 
accrual anomaly. Current research attempting to test discretionary accruals are actually 
tests of ( 1) whether investors accurately parse total accruals into the discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components and (2) whether investors effectively evaluate cash flows, 
discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals for their implications on future firm 
performance. With an improved model of discretionary accruals, this test becomes a test 
of the single hypothesis (stated in the null): 
H2: Investors price discretionary accruals according to their persistence 
and thus correctly reflect their implications for future earnings. 
3.3. SUMMARY 
This research attempts to develop a better-specified discretionary accrual model 
that controls for instability in the time-series data and for any manipulation of net income 
through the use of discretionary accruals during the estimation period .. The improved 
stationary model is evaluated by comparing its performance to the performance of the 
Jones (1991) model. The research then evaluates the accrual anomaly to gauge whether 
the anomaly truly exists or whether it may be the result of mismeasurement of 
discretionary accruals caused by an inadequate model. 
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CHAPTER4 
4. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
There is a large body of accounting research that relies on the measurement of 
accruals (Collins and Hribar 2000). No single model of discretionary accruals has gained 
acceptance among researchers as being sufficiently descriptive. A model that more 
accurately captures management's discretionary accruals will give researchers greater 
insight as to how companies adjust earnings to satisfy the market. Further, improved 
estimates of the discretionary and nondiscretionary components of total accruals will be 
useful in the above-cited streams of research. 
The proposal for this research indicated that an attempt would be made to develop 
an "improved model of discretionary accruals." This goal is thought necessary because 
of the inadequacy of the Jones ( 1991) model or any completing models at accurately 
measuring the portion of accruals attributable to management discretion. The effects of 
nonstationarity are evaluated using the techniques ofBrown, Durbin and Evans (1975). 
Model development began using a hypothetical (i.e., "made up") data set, thus allowing 
for the manipulation of the level of income through the use of various working capital 
accounts that would constitute discretionary accruals. It is believed that by using this 
procedure, the Jones (1991) model could be analyzed for its deficiencies and that a more 
accurate discretionary accrual model would emerge. 
4.1 HYPOTHETICAL DATA 
The development of the hypothetical data set begins with a number of 
assumptions. The model starts with 23 years of data, with 20 of the years used as the 
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estimation period and the remaining two periods used as the test periods. One period is 
lost because the change in revenues variable required there to be a lag year to compute 
the change, and because lagged assets are used as a weighting variable. The data 
assumes a steady increase in sales (2.5%) and that 75 percent of the sales are for cash and 
the remaining sales are on credit. 
There are three expenses included in the data. One is a purely cash expense, 
commissions, and the other two are accrual expenses that do not require an immediate 
cash outlay. One of the accruals is for bad debt expenses and the other is for 
depreciation. Commission expenses are assumed to be 40 percent of total sales. Bad 
debt expense is assumed to be 20 percent of credit sales and it is assumed that the actual 
bad debts written off are equal to the estimate and that the entire bad debts are realized in 
the year subsequent to the estimate. Depreciation expense is a function of the property, 
plant and equipment and it is assumed that the firm is depreciating the assets over 20 
years. Finally, it is assumed that the owners made an initial contribution of $5,000 and 
, . 
that the money is invested in fixed assets, and further that all income is retained in the 
firm (i.e., no dividend payments). 
The hypothetical data without any structural shifts in the time-series data is shown 
in Table 1. Total accruals are shown at the bottom of the table. Total accruals (ACCR) 
are calculated by subtracting cash flows from operations (CFO) from net income (NI). 
Starting in period one, total accruals are $(240.00), and they remain at this level with only 
slight increases every period throughout the model estimation period and the test period, 
eventually rising to $(233.20) at the end of the 23-year period. The reconciliation of the 
$(240.00) in period one is the result ofremoving $400 in cash received in Period 1 that is 
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recorded as income in Period 0, adding $513 in credit sales to be received in a future 
period, and subtracting out the noncash expenses, bad debt expense and depreciation, 
which are $103 and $250, respectively. That is, net income is $240 less than it would 
have been if the hypothetical data are reported on a cash basis. 
Calculation of Total Accruals in Year 1: 
Net income 
Less: CFO 
Total accruals 
alternatively, 
Cash sales 
Collections of AR 
Commission Expense 
Collection of AR from period zero 
Credit Sales from current period 
Non-cash expenses 
Total accruals 
$ 1,538.00 
400.00 
{820.00) 
$ 878.00 
(1,118.00) 
$ (240.00) 
$ (400.00) 
513.00 
{353.00) 
$ (240.00) 
The change in revenues (AREY) is calculated by subtracting revenues in period t-
1 from revenues in period t (AREV1 = REV1 - REV1.1). Property plant and equipment is 
started at $5,000 and increased slightly each period to obtain.sufficient variation to allow 
estimation of the coefficient on that variable. 
4.1.1 Stationary Data 
The stationary data is first estimated with the Jones model, making careful 
observations of the errors in the estimates to evaluate possible alterations to the model 
that would provide more accurate estimates. The ordinary least squares coefficient 
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estimates for the Jones (1991) model using the hypothetical data are given in Table 2. 
The model parameters have the expected signs and are generally consistent with 
expectations. For example, the intercept parameter is $(238.80), which is very close to 
the average total accrual amount of $(237.23) over the estimation period. This is 
expected because there is little variation in the independent variables during the 
estimation period for this stationary data that would have affected the level of total 
accruals. The coefficient on the change in revenues variable is 0.2012, which indicates 
that total accruals increase by $0.20 for every dollar change in revenues. The coefficient 
on the change in revenues variable is positive, as expected. Increases in the levels of 
sales should produce corresponding increases in the level of total accruals. The 
coefficient on the property, plant and equipment variable is -0.0025. The coefficient on 
. the property, plant and equipment variable is expected to be negative. Increases in 
depreciable assets result in increased depreciation expense ( a noncash expense), which 
produces decreases in the levels of total accruals. 
The coefficient estimates are then used to make a prediction of total accruals 
during the test period to determine the accuracy of the model as shown in equation (3), 
which is as follows: 
DA= -233.20/31,270.14 - [-238.81 *(1/31,270.14) + 0.20*(83.98/31,270.14) ""'0.00225*(5,022/31,270.14) 
DA:;: -233.20-(-233.30) = $0.10 (see also Table 2) 
The Jones ( 1991) model is extremely accurate using data that did not contain any 
structural shifts. The estimate of total accruals forthe test period (i.e., Period 22) is 
$(233.30) and actual accruals for that period are $(233.20) (see table 1). Therefore, the 
Jones (1991) model estimates discretionary accruals to be $0.10. In reality, there is no 
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manipulation of the hypothetical data during the test period, which would duplicate the 
outcome if management has not used its discretion during the test period. 
4.1.2 Nondiscretionary Changes 
Next, the hypothetical data set is manipulated to determine the accuracy of the 
Jones (1991) model when the data are not stationary. In this simple hypothetical data set 
there are two possible sources of structural shifts. Structural shifts may be the result of 
normal changes in the business circumstances of the firm (i.e., nondiscretionary) or the 
structural shifts may be the result of management manipulation of the accounting 
numbers (i.e., discretionary). The effects of nondiscretionary changes in the hypothetical 
data are evaluated first, and then discretionary changes are evaluated. 
One possible source of a nondiscretionary change would arise if the firm changed 
its investment in property, plant and equipment. This type of change in the levels of 
accruals should have a more lasting effect than some other changes in accruals, which 
will be discussed later. The above data set is modified by assuming that the firm has 
· added additional property, plant and equipment. Three scenarios a.re considered with 
additions assumed to be made in Periods five, ten and 15. Tables 3, 4 and 5 contain the 
data used for the asset additions. In the data containing the.asset addition in Year 5, it is 
interesting to note the semi-permanent effect ofthe asset addition on total accruals. In 
the stationary data, the total accruals average $(23 7) over the estimation and test periods. 
In the year of the asset addition, a significant decrease·in the level of total accruals is 
observed. In year four, before the asset additio~ total accruals are close to the average 
for stationary data at $(239.23). However, the asset addition in Year 5 caused accruals to 
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drop to $( 488.96). This drop is precipitated by the increased depreciation on the added 
assets. Depreciation increased by $250, which caused a corresponding decrease in total 
accruals of about $250. This is the result in the year of the asset addition for all three 
asset addition scenarios. In spite of this, the Jones (1991) model performs very well in 
predicting total accruals during the test period. This is because the Jones (1991) model 
contains a variable that is intended to control for increases in depreciation caused by 
changes in fixed assets, the level of property, plant and equipment. 
The coefficient estimates for the three scenarios along with the estimates of 
discretionary accruals are included in Table 6. The coefficient estimates for all three 
scenarios are very similar. The intercept variable changes dramatically from the intercept 
for the data without any structural. shifts. Where there are no structural shifts during the 
estimation period, the intercept is very close the level of total accruals. However, when , 
some nondiscretiomi.ry changes are added, the coefficient seems to lose its significance in 
estimating total accruals, dropping to less than $2 for all three scenarios. Although it is 
still statistically significant, the total dollar level decreases to a very low amount. The 
coefficient on the change in revenue variable does not change drastically from the 
stationary estimates, staying close to 0.23, which indicates that total accruals vary by 0.23 
cents for every dollar change in revenues. The parameter on the property, plant and 
equipment variable also changes rather dramatically from the stationary estimate (as one 
would expect) because now the level of property, plant and equipment has a major impact 
on the level of accruals. The parameter estimate becomes significant and increases in 
value to -0.05 for all three scenarios, which indicates that total accruals should decrease 
by five cents for every dollar invested in PPE. One striking outcome of the three 
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scenarios is how similar the parameter estimates are. They are very close, indicating that 
the model controls very well for changes in depreciation expense regardless of the period 
of change. 
The best measure of the model's ability to control for a nondiscretionary change 
is to evaluate its performance with the hypothetical data. In these three scenarios there is 
no manipulation of accruals during the test period. Therefore, the successful 
discretionary accrual model would have errors of approximately zero during the test 
period, as the Jones (1991) model did here. The estimates of total accruals for the test 
period for the three scenarios are all very close to the actual level of total accruals during 
the test period. The model controls very well for changes in accruals caused by changes 
in one of the explanatory variables. 
4.1.3- Discretionary Changes - Non reversing 
Next, an evaluation of the model with the hypothetical data is made where the 
change in depreciation expense is attributable to managerial discretion. Accordingly, the 
change in depreciation expense is not accompanied by a corresponding change in the 
level ofPPE. 
Presumably, discretionary manipulation of the data would be to increase the level 
of reported net income. Accordingly, a change in the depreciable lives of the fixed assets 
is assumed to occur, causing corresponding decreases in depreciation expense. All 
assumptions regarding the data set an~ as they are with the stationary data, except that the 
depreciation expense is decreased by half for three different scenarios occurring at 
different time periods. As before, this type of change is not one that normally reverses 
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quickly. The decrease in depreciation expense does not have any immediate negative 
consequences, as would a change in other type of expense accounts. . The three different 
scenario changes decreased depreciation expense in Periods 5, 10 and 15. The data for 
the different scenarios is provided in Tables 7, 8 and 9. 
The parameter estimates for the Jones (1991) model using the hypothetical data 
are shown in Table 10. Discretionary structural shifts in the data during the estimation 
period cause the Jones model to provide inaccurate estimates of discretionary accruals. 
Additionally, the results are considerably different depending on when the structural shift 
occurs. In the first scenario, the structural shift occurs early during the estimation period, 
at five years. The coefficient estimates bear little resemblance to the original coefficient 
estimates obtained with the stationary data nor even to the coefficient estimates obtained 
when there is a nondiscretionary structural shift in the time series. The coefficient 
estimates for the intercept term are in the tens and hundreds of thousands and are 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative. In spite of this, the intercept parameter is 
statistically significant for the five-year and the fifteen-year scenarios. 
The parameter estimates for the change in revenues variable and the property, 
plant and equipment variable are also inconsistent, and have different signs depending on 
the period in which the discretionary change is assumed to occur. However, as above, 
both variables are statistically significant for the five and fifteen-year scenarios. The 
estimates of total accruals for the test period are equally disappointing. The model erred 
in estimating discretionary accruals in all three scenarios and in different directions (see 
Table 10). Overall, the results of the Jones (1991) model are very poor when there is a 
structural shift in the time series caused by managerial manipulation of net income. This 
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is troubling because the Jones (1991) model is devised and is used widely to estimate 
discretionary accruals for testing market efficiency, as in this paper, and it is apparent 
even from this simplified data set that the model is susceptible to serious and random 
errors when there is managerial manipulation during the estimation period of the model. · 
4.1.4 Discretionary Accruals -- Reversing 
As mentioned above, accrual manipulation can have differing effects· on 
subsequent periods' income depending on what type of discretion is used. For example, 
the depreciation changes above do not have substantial immediate consequences on . 
subsequent·periods'·net income. The only effect suffered by a company that increases 
the depreciable lives of its fixed assets is that the expense of the assets is spread over 
more periods. This increases income during the period of change and for the subsequent 
periods. It also increases the length of time the company must endure the expense, but 
this may be many periods into the future before this effect is realized. Other changes, 
however, are much more temporary, in that they reverse in subsequent periods. One 
example of this type of discretionary accrual would be if management underestimated the 
bad debt expense ofthe firm. 
The hypothetical data being used in this example assumed that bad debts are equal 
to 20 percent of credit sales and that actual collections are in line with this estimate. One 
could envision a circumstance where management wished to increase net income, so they 
used their discretion to change the estimate of bad debts. If the bad debt collections 
continued to be the same then the accrual would subsequently reverse when the bad debts 
not accounted for earlier had to be written off in later periods. 
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The hypothetical data set will now be manipulated by using discretion in the 
estimates of bad debts. However, to make the example differ from the depreciation 
example above, the bad debt experience is assumed not to change. That is, management 
will change its estimate of bad debts to ten percent of credit sales but the actual bad debt 
experience will remain 20 percent of credit sales. In this way management can 
manipulate net income in the short run but there is a subsequent reversal that will cause 
later periods' net income to be lower because the manipulation reverses itself in the 
following periods. 
. . 
All assumptions remain from the stationary example above, except now it is 
assumed that management desires to increase the income of the firm in a particular period 
by changing its estimate of bad debts to ten percent. However, subsequently, the bad 
debts continue to be 20 percent of credit sales. Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14 contain the 
hypothetical data set contairting discretionary changes in bad debt expense occurring in 
Periods 5, 10, 13 and 15, respectively. 
It is interesting to notice the effect on total accruals by making the discretionary 
change in the estimate of bad debt expense. The reversing effect is very noticeable. For 
instance, before the change made in Year 5 of the first scenario total accruals are about 
$(240.00). The change caused an increase in total. accruals in Year 5 to $(182), then 
accruals drop to the_lower amount of $(293) and then in the second year after the change 
the total accrual amount has recovered back to about $(240). The reversing discretionary 
change caused a shock to the system, but after two years the total accrual amount has 
recovered to its previous level. One important note here is that eventually management 
will have to revise its estimate of bad debts to the correct amount, and in that year there 
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will be a dramatic drop in the level of total accruals because the bad debt expense will 
reflect the make up of the prior year lower amount and the current year will be for the 
correct amount. 
The coefficient estimates for the Jones (1991) model for the four scenarios are 
shown in Table 15 along with the model's estimate of discretionary accruals. There 
appears to be a trend in the parameter estimates depending on the period of the change. 
All of the parameter estimates are insignificant, although the model R-squares remain 
high (as they have throughout). The estimates of the discretionary accruals appear to be 
influenced by the period of the shock. The Jones (1991) model predicts total accruals to 
be $(233.99) for the five-year scenario, which is relatively closeto the actual total 
accruals of the hypothetical data set of$(233.15). The error in the prediction is not 
nearly as close for the other three scenarios however, missing by $4.06, $23.46 and 
$12.87 for the 10, 13 and IS-year scenarios, respectively. 
4.1.5 Discretionary Changes - Multiple 
Finally, the Jones (1991) model is evaluated using the hypothetical data with 
more than one change caused by managerial discretion. It has previously been 
demonstrated thatthe Jones {1991) model is susceptible to inaccuracy when there is 
managerial discretion during the estimation period. This example serves to illustrate that 
the results from the regression of the time-series data.with the Jones (1991) model can be 
misleading. The hypothetical data set is provided in Table 16. The data is subject to two 
structural shifts caused by discretionary changes. The first shift occurs in Period 10 when 
bad debt expenses are again estimated to be ten percent. As above, the estimate goes to 
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ten percent for the remaining periods but the actual bad debts continues to be 20 percent. 
This provides the reversing accrual and the permanent accrual is caused by a 
discretionary change in the depreciation expense ofthe fixed assets during Period 12. 
Both of these changes effect total accruals. 
Table 17 provides the parameter estimates for the Jones (1991) model with the 
two discretionary changes. The coefficient estimates for the change in revenues and 
property, plant and equipment have the expected signs and appear t'o be reasonable in 
amount. The intercept parameter is 198,108, which indicates that total accruals would be 
positive 198,000 in the absence of any change in revenues or PPE. Also of interest is that 
all three parameters are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Table 17 shows 
that the Jones (1991) model predicts total accruals to be $(0.19), however, the total 
accrual amount for the test period is $(108.20). The model is off by $108, which is 
extremely poor. To summarize, the model appears to be ~ell specified when one looks at 
the statistical information, but the model fails to accurately estimate discretionary 
accruals. 
4.1.6 Hypothetical Data Conclusions 
To evaluate the Jones (1991) model, a simple hypothetical data set is constructed 
and manipulated. This is done to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the model and 
to gain insight into possible improvements for future model development. The results 
show that the Jones (1991) model is reasonably well specified for data that do not contain 
any structural shifts. The model works relatively well when there is no managerial 
discretion present during the estimation period. However, this seems likely to seldom be 
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the case. After all the model is developed to estimate discretionary accruals, which 
surely exist. 
·When managerial discretion is introduced into the hypothetical data, the estimates 
of discretionary accruals provided by the Jones ( 1991) model are less reliable. Further, 
the errors appear to be more pronounced when the managerial discretion is non reversing. 
Additionally, an example is introduced where the statistical results from the regression 
appear to support the notion that the model is well specified. However, upon closer 
examination of the results and the prediction of the model; it is determined that the model 
is not performing well at all. 
4.2 NONSTATIONARITY AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
One of the main premises of this research is that structural shifts cause the 
estimates of discretionary accruals provided by the Jones (1991) model to be inaccurate 
as illustrated in the analysis of the hypothetical data set above. Many researchers address 
this problem by estimating the Jones (1991) model cross-sectionally by two-digit SIC 
code. This approach is flawed because it assumes that because firms are in the same 
industry that their total accruals behave in the same way .. One possible way that the 
Jones (1991) model may be improved is to remove the structural shifts in the time-series 
data caused by managerial di~cretion during the estimation period. 
Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) develop the TIMV AR program that contains 
techniques that are able to identify structural shifts in time-series data. Removing the 
unstable periods in the data provides the ability to obtain more accurate estimates of 
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discretionary accruals of the Jones ( 1991) model. The ability of the TIMV AR techniques 
is evaluated using the hypothetical data set. 
4.2.1 Tests of Parameter Nonstationarity in Linear Regression Relationships Using 
Time-Series Data 
The following basic regression model is considered: 
(6) 
where Yr is the observation on the dependent variable at time t, xr is the column. vector of 
observations on k regressors, and ~t is the column vector of parameters. The first 
regressor, xu, takes the value of one if the model contains a constant. The use of 
subscript ( in ~t is to indicate that the parameters may change over time. The error terms, 
ur, are assumed to be independent and normally distributed with means zero and 
variances <Pt2, t = 1, ... , T. The null hypothesis of constancy over time can be expressed 
as: 
The TIMV AR program uses the cusum test, cusum of squares test and the 
homegeneity test to investigate the validity of Ho. The cusum test i~ useful for 
identifying small and gradual changes in time-series data, whereas the homogeneity test 
is good at detecting distinct changes in data (Brown et al. 1975). IfHo is rejected by any 
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of these tests, then the Quandt's log-likelihood ratio statistic is used to pinpoint the time 
where structural changes in the data occur. Cusum of squares test is excluded in this 
study because Brown et al. (1975) observe that this test is sensitive to changes in the 
variances of the residuals. 
4.2.2 Cusum Test 
The cu sum test statistically tests the constancy of garameters by examining the 
cumulative sums of recursive residuals. The recursive residuals are defined as: 
r = k + l, ... , T, (7) 
where X'r-I = [ XI, ... , Xr-il, hr-I = (X'r-IXr-IrIX'r-I Yr-I , and Y'r-I = [yI, ... , Yr-I]. Assuming 
the above equation holds, it can be shown that Wk+1, ... , Wr are independent, N(O, #). 
If Pt stays constant up to a certain time point and differs from this constant value 
thereafter, then thew/swill have zero means for r up to that point and non-zero means 
afterwards. Thus, the cusum test examines the cusum quantity 
. 1 r 
w, =-;; I w1, 
(J k+I 
(8) 
against r for r = k+ 1, ... , T, where <i denotes the estimated standard deviation determined 
by <i2 = Srl(T-k), and Sr denotes the residual sums of squares of the regression using all 
T observations. 
Since the wr's are N(O, #) under Ho, the Wr's are approximately normal variables 
such that: 
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E(Wr) =O, 
Var(Wr) = r - k, and 
-Cov(Wr, W,) = min(r, s) - k . 
Using these mean and covariance functions, a test is derived by approximating Wr 
through the Brownian motion process starting from zero at time t = k. This results in a 
pair of symmetrical straight lines, above and below the mean value line E(Wr) = 0. These 
two lines go through the points {k, ±a°"(T-k)}, {T, ±3~(T-k)}, where the parameter a is 
determined based on known results of Brownian motion theory such that the probability 
of the sample path crossing one or both lines is a, the desired significance level. Critical 
values of a for a= .01, .OS, and .10 are, respectively, 1.143, .948, and '.850. If for any r, 
W,. falls outside the region between the two lines, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
4.2.3 Homogeneity Tests 
A second method for testing the changes in ft over time fits a regression on a 
. short segment of n successive observations that is then moved along the time series. 
Based on this approach,· a homogeneity test can be derived from the results of regressions 
based on non-overlapping time segments, using the analysis of variance. The non-
overlapping time segments for a moving regression oflength n, are (1, n), ((n+l), 2n), : .. , 
((p-2)n+l, (p-l)n), ((p-l)n + 1, 1), where pis the integral part of Tin. The homogeneity 
statistic. is calculated as: 
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F = [ (T- kp)l S(I, T)- {S(I,n)+S(n + l,2n)+ ... +S(pn-2n+ l,pn-n)+S(pn-n+ l,T)} 
k(p-1) {S(I,n)+S(n+ l,2n)+ ... + S(pn-n+l,T)} 
(9) 
where S(r, s) is the residual sums of squares from the regression using observations from 
t = r to s inclusive. Under Ho this statistic is distributed as F(kp-k, T-kp ). If p = 2, the 
above F test is equivalent to the Chow( 1960) test. 
4.2.4 Quandt's Log-likelihood Ratio Technique 
The Quandt's log-likelihood ratio technique is used to detect the time-point, t = r, 
in which the parameters change from one constant value to another constant value. The 
development of this technique is described in Quandt (1958). For each r from r = k+ 1 to 
r = T - k - 1 the ratio 
max likelihood of the observations given H 0 
Qr = log10 (max likelihood of the observations given HA)' 
is computed, where HA is the hypothesis that the observations in the time segments 
(l, ... ,r) and (r+l, ... , 1) come from two different regressions. It can be shown that 
1 A2 1 A2 1 A2 Q = -rlogu +-(T-r)logu --Tlogu 
r 2 I 2 2 2 . (10) 
where ci/, if and ci2 are the ratios ofthe residual sums ofsquaresto number of 
observations when the regression is fitted to the first r observations, the remaining T-r 
observations, and the whole set of T observations, respectively. The estimate of the point 
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at which the switch from one relationship to another has occurred is the value of r at 
which Qr attains its minimum. 
· 4.2.5 Algorithm for Identifying Stable Parameters 
Given the parameters from the Jones (1991) model as follo:ws: 
from year r1 to r2, where r2 ~ r1+k, both the cusum test and the homogeneity test are used 
. to examine the hypothesis of stationarity for the coefficients a;, bli, and b2;. A 
significance level of O .10 is used for both tests. In the homogeneity test, the moving 
regressions are performed on length n, where n varies from k to the integral part of (r2 -
r1+ 1)/2, incremented by one. If the homogeneity statistic of using any of these lengths is 
significant, then the time series fails the homogeneity test. Stable coefficients are defined 
for an interval when both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
The recursive procedure used to identify all periods where the parameters are . 
I . 
stable works as follows: 
Step 1. Initialize by letting r1 = 1 and r2 = T, i.e., the program starts by examining the full 
period of the time-series. 
Step 2. If the time series from r1 to r2 passes both the cusum test and the homogeneity 
test, then the GLS parameter estimates on the time series from r 1 and r2 are 
considered. to be stationary. 
Step 3. If the time series from r1 to r2 fails either the cusum test or the homogeneity test, 
then the Quandt's log-likelihood ratio technique is used to identify the point of 
40 
time, r, r1 < r < r2, at which the non-stationarity has most likely oc'curred. This 
defines two new subperiods: (r1, r) and (r+ 1, r2). 
Step 4. Repeat the tests for the latter subperiod, i.e., return to Step 2, where r1 and r2 are 
defined as the lower and upper limits of the upper subperiod. 
The algorithm ends when a subperiod with stable parameters has been identified prior to 
the test period. This period wherein the parameters are identified as stable is then used 
to predict the expected total accruals in the Jones (1991) model. Then as explained 
previously, the difference between actual total accruals and predicted accruals is the 
measured discretionary accruals that is used to initially test the accrual anomaly. 
4.3 TIMVAR AND THE HYPOTHETICAL DATA SET 
The TIMV AR program is then analyzed using the hypothetical data set. The 
program is first tested with the stationary data, shown in Table 1. The TIMV AR program 
indicates that the data are stationary and the estimated the parameters from the model are 
the same as when estimated using the SAS software. The TIMV AR program is then 
analyzed using the hypothetical data that contains structural shifts as above to determine 
the effect of removing those shifts on the ability of the Jones (1991) model to accurately 
estimate discretionary accruals. As before, the model is evaluated first using the data that 
simulated a nondiscretionary change with the addition of property, plant and equipment 
in years 5, 10 and 15. The data for the nondiscretionary asset additions are shown in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5. When the Jones (1991) model is tested with the nondiscretionary 
change in depreciation due to an asset addition, it still made accurate predictions, 
regardless of the period when the asset is added. This is due to·the independent variable 
' . 
property, plant and equipment, which controlled for nondiscretionary changes in 
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depreciation expense brought about by changes in depreciable assets. The three scenarios 
containing changes due to changes in the amount of depreciable assets is run through 
TIMV AR. The TIMV AR program does not identify any structural shifts in the data and 
the coefficient estimates are the same as those obtained in the first analysis. 
The data containing the structural shifts due to managerial discretion is then 
tested. First, the data is tested to determine if the TIMV AR program could accurately 
identify nonstationary periods. Then the program is used to estimate the parameters of 
the Jones model to evaluate the errors in relation to the errors obtained using the Jones 
(1991) model over the entire estimation period (i.e., the 20 year estimation period as. 
above). Finally, the ability of the model to estimate discretionary accruals in the test 
period is evaluated by comparing the total accruals predicted by the model to actual 
accruals in the hypothetical data for the test period. 
The hypothetical data set is manipulated as before. The first test is on 
discretionary accruals that do not immediately reverse. For the hypothetical data set the 
nonreversing discretionary accrual manipulated is a change in the depreciation expense. 
It is assumed in three different scenarios that the depreciation expense is changed by 
management to increase reported net income. The hypothetical data for the three 
scenarios is shown in Tables 7, 8 and 9 for the change occurring in Periods 5, 10 and 15, 
respectively. As above, the discretionary change in the depreciation expense caused an 
increase in the amount of total accruals from about $(240) to around $(111) and accruals 
persisted at this level with slight increases each period to the end of the 22 years of 
hypothetical data. 
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The data are read into the TIMV AR program to determine if there are any 
statistically significant structural shifts in the time series. The performance of the 
TIMV AR program is evaluated because the timing of the structural shifts are known a 
priori. TIMV AR successfully identified the structural shifts in all three scenarios. The 
TIMV AR program identifies the structural shift, and then tests the period after the shift. 
If no shift is found in the latter sub-period, the program estimates the parameters from the 
Jones (1991) model for the remaining periods in the estimation period. The program then 
computes the estimated discretionary accrual for the test period by calculating the 
predicted total accrual of the model and subtracting that number from the actual accrual. 
The parameter estimates and the estimates of discretionary accruals are shown in 
Table 18. Removing the nonstationary periods dramatically increases the ability of the 
model to accurately estimate the amount of discretionary accruals during the test period. 
Table 18 shows that the Jones (1991) mo~el had large errors when estimated with the 
discretionary change in depreciation, with the model having errors of $69.67, $(86.75) 
and $(86.61) for the five, ten and 15 year scenarios, respectively. However, when the 
discretionary depreciation changes are removed from the estimation period of the model, 
the model does not err in predicting total accruals. 
The TIMV AR program is then tested using the hypothetical data containing 
discretionary changes that reverse in a short period of time, the change in the estimates of 
bad debts. The hypothetical data has the same assumptions as before and is shown for 
the five, ten, 13 and 15-year scenarios in Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14, respectively. Again 
the TIMV AR program is extremely accurate at locating the structural shifts in the time-
series data. The program successfully identified the point of nonstationarity for all three 
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scenarios. The estimates of the parameters of the Jones (1991) model estimated over the 
stationary period prior to the test period are shown in Table 19, as well as the estimates of 
the model of discretionary accruals. Again, after the nonstatioriary periods are removed 
the Jones ( 1991) model is very accurate at predicting the total accruals during the test 
period and thus is very accurate at estimating the discretionary accruals. 
Finally, the TIMV AR program is tested on the data containing multiple shifts. 
The data with multiple shifts is shown in Table 16. The data contains a discretionary 
change in the estimate of bad debt expense in Year 10 and a discretionary change in the 
depreciation expense in Year 12, as above. The coefficient estimates and estimates of 
discretionary accruals are shown in Table 20. The TIMV AR program correctly identifies 
the structural shift and the coefficient estimates have their expected signs. The estimate 
of discretionary accruals using the stationary data is again very accurate, indicating that 
the TIMV AR program is very successful at identifying structural shifts in the estimation 
period of the model that are due to managerial discretion. 
4.4 OVERALL ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the Jones (1991) model to determine if 
there is a way to obtain more accurate estimates of discretionary accruals. Once a better 
model emerges, then that model is used to test the accrual anomaly. Development of the 
improved model begins with a hypothetical data set that is used to evaluate the 
.. performance of the Jones (1991) model. A hypothetical data set is used to allow the 
researcher to manipulate nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals during the 
estimation period of the model. 
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The analysis of the hypothetical data shows that the Jones (1991) model performs 
reasonably well when the data used to estimate the model do not contain any structural 
shifts. Further, the model is equally impressive when the structural shift is the result of 
nondiscretionary changes in the amount of accruals. However, when the structural shifts 
are the result of management manipulation (i.e., discretionary accruals), the ,estimates of 
discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model are inaccurate. This leads 
one to believe that the Jones model performs badly when there are discretionary accruals 
included in the estimation period. 
Using the techniques of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975), the hypothetical data is 
used again to estimate the Jones (1991) model. However these tests utilized the 
TIMV AR program to identify the structural shifts in the time series. The TIMV AR 
program is extremely accurate at identifying the structural shifts of the model. The 
structural shifts are identified by TIMV AR and the Jones ( 1991) model is then estimated 
with the remaining stationary periods prior to the test period. The.Jones ( 1991) model 
performs very well when the discretionary structural shifts are removed from the 
estimation. 
It appears that the Jones (1991) model is sufficient for its intended task so long as 
the researcher tests for any discretionary structural shifts during the estimation period. 
The TIMV AR program can be used to examine the time-series data. The data for the 
entire estimation period can be tested. If any nonstationary periods are discovered, the 
TIMV AR program then tests the data succeeding the point of nonstationarity until the 
longest time series of stable observations prior to the test period are located. This stable 
time series is then used to estimate the Jones ( 1991) model to make predictions of total 
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accruals for the test period. Actual accruals for the test period are then compared to the 
predicted accruals of the model and this difference should be a more accurate estimate of 
discretionary accruals than would have otherwise been obtained if the Jones (1991) 
model had been estimated with the entire time series that contained the structural shift. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the data collection procedures, the 
sample selection and the statistical tests to be used to test the hypotheses. 
5.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The financial accounting data for the sample firms is gathered from the 
COMPUSTAT/Research Insight database. The information collected is the information 
necessary for the estimation of the Jones (1991) model. 
where: 
TAit = total accruals in year t for firm i (See below for calculation); 
AREVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i (Research Insight item 
#12); 
PP~t = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i (Research Insight item 
. #7); 
Ait-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i (Rese_arch Insight item # 6); 
Eit = error term in year t for firm i; 
To estimate the Jones (1991) model, information necessary for the calculation of 
total accruals is also collected. Total accruals are calculated as the change in noncash 
working capital before income taxes payable less total depreciation expense. The change 
in noncash working capital before taxes is defined as the change· in current assets other 
than cash and short-term investments less current liabilities other than current maturities 
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oflong-term debt and income taxes payable (Jones 1991). Thus, the composition of total 
accruals (T At) is as follows: 
T~t = [AC~ -ACashit]....: [ACLit -ASTDit -ATPit] -DepreCit (13) 
where: 
, 
TAit == total accruals; 
ACAit = change in current assets from period t-1 to period t (Research Insight item #4); 
ACashit = change in cash from period t-1 to period t (Research Insight item # 1 ); 
change in current liabilities from period t-1 to period t (Research Insight item 
#5); 
ASTDit = change in current maturities oflong-term debt from period t-1 to period t 
(Research Insight item #34); 
ATPit = change in income taxes payable from period t-1 to period t (Research Insight item 
#71); and 
DepreCit = depreciation and amortization expense for period t (Research Insight item 
#14). 
The accrual anomaly is tested using both the Mishkin (1983) test and a hedge 
portfolio test. Following Sloan (1996}and Xi~ (2001), both of these tests require the 
size-adjusted abnormal returns of the sample firms. The size-adjusted abnormal returns 
of the firms are calculated as difference between a firm's annual buy-and-hold returns 
and the buy-and-hold return for the same 12-month period on the market-capitalization-
based portfolio decile (i.e., size decile) to which the firm belongs. The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database returns and size decile breakpoints are used · 
to classify each firm into a size decile according to its market value of equity at the 
beginning of the calendar year in which the 12-month return period begins. The CRSP 
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size deciles. are based on the market capitalization deciles of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms. 
The data usedto test the discretionary accrual models are the levels of 
discretionary accruals as estimated by the Jones (1991) and the stationary Jones models. 
The Mishkin (1993) test and a hedge portfolio test are used to test the accrual anomaly. 
The data necessary for the hedge portfolio test is the level of discretionary accruals of the 
firms as estimated by the Jones ( 1991) model and the stationary Jones model and the 
size-adjusted abnormal returns. The Mishkin test requires the earnings of the firm, the 
components of earnings and the size-adjusted abnormal return. The earnings variable is 
obtained from Research Insight (Research Insight item #18), and the size-adjusted 
abnormal return is calculated from data obtained from CRSP. The components of 
earnings are calculated based on the level of earnings (Research Insight item # 18), cash 
flows from operations and the discretionary accruals.estimated by the Jones (1991) and 
stationary Jones models. Cash from operations is obtained by taking earnings and 
subtracting total accruals as defined above and nondiscretionary accruals are obtained by 
subtracting the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model 
and the stationary Jones model from total accruals as follows (see Xie (2001) and Sloan 
(1996)): 
CF01 = Earn1 - T At; and 
NDAt = T At - DAt. 
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5.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
Originally, the Jones (1991) model is estimated using ordinary least squares with 
time-series data. The Jones ( 1991) model includes variables that are intended to control 
for changes in total accruals that are due to changes in the economic circumstances of the 
firm. That is, the Jones (1991) model has the change in revenue variable and the 
property, plant and equipment variables to account for changes in total accruals resulting 
from changes in sales and the changes in depreciation due to changes in depreciable 
assets. Despite this, the Jones (1991) model has been used extensively with cross-
sectional data. 
This research uses the Jones (1991) model with time-series data. Consequently, 
the sample of firms for this study must have useable variables from the 
COMPUSTAT/Research Insight and CRSP databases for the duration of both the 
estimation period and test periods of the model. The initial sample included all 21,371 
firms contained in the COMPUSTAT/Research Insight database. All firms with missing 
financial data during the 20-year period are eliminated, leaving 1,439 firms. Then the 
return information is collected from the CRSP database. Firms with missing return 
information are also eliminated from the sample, leaving a final sample of762 firms. 
5.3 STATISTICALTESTS 
5.3.1 Tests of the Discretionary Accrual Models 
The stationary Jones model and the improved model are evaluated using the 
techniques of Thomas and Zhang (2000). Thomas and Zhang use an adjusted or pseudo-
50 
R 2 and firm-specific rankings of the predicted errors to evaluate the relative and absolute 
accuracy of six commonly used models of discretionary accruals. 
To evaluate the relative performance of the models, the distribution of forecast· 
errors across models for the same forecast firm year are compared (Thomas and Zhang 
2000). This allows each firm year to serve as its own control, holding the level of true 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals constant across the models for each firm 
year. Thomas and Zhang's work is limited because it assumed that discretionary accruals 
are rare in the estimation period. However, using the techniques of Brown, Durbin and 
Evans (1975) for identifying structural shifts in time-series data, the likelihood of 
discretionary accruals in the estimation period causing errors in the estimates of the 
models is reduced. 
Twenty years of financial data for estimatingthe models is obtained from the 
2001 editions of the annual COMPUSTAT/Research Insight files. The first 15 years 
(1982-1995) are designated the estimation period, and are used to estimate the model 
· parameters. Since prior year data is required for the estimates of the Jones (1991) and the 
stationary Jones models to compute total accruals, only 14 years of data are available in 
the estimation period. The last five years of data (1996-2001) are designated as the 
prediction period, and are used to compare forecast errors across the models. Those firms 
with variables missing that are necessary for forecasting are eliminated from the sample. 
Further, the data for the 2001 year is incomplete at the time the models are estimated, 
I 
therefore it is eliminated from the sample. A firm year is included in the sample, only if 
accrual forecasts are available for all models. Forecasts are available for 1,474 firms in 
the prediction period, providing 5,896 firm years in the prediction period. The model 
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parameters are estimated over the prediction period, and are fixed throughout the entire 
prediction period. 
The techniques of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) are used to estimate the 
stationary Jones model using only stationary data during the estimation period. Further, 
any identified structural shifts in the time-series data in the prediction period are also 
eliminated. 
Model accuracy is evaluated in four ways (Thomas and Zhang 2000). First, the 
distribution of raw forecast errors for each model is evaluated during the four-year 
prediction period, which included a comparison of the standard deviations for the models 
and interquartile ranges and spread between the' 10th and 90th percentiles. Next, the 
· models are compared based on firm-specific rankings of the forecast errors. For each 
firm, the models are ranked based on the sum of squared forecast error for all years with 
forecasts in the prediction period. This approach offers a different perspective than the 
first evaluation because it ignores the magnitudes of the differences. This evaluation 
favors discretionary accrual models that perform well in most firms, perhaps by a small 
margin, and not perform well occasionally,, even ifby large margins (Thomas and Zhang 
2000). 
The third measure of accuracy computes a pseudo-R2.for each model during the 
prediction period. The pseudo-R2 for both the Jones (1991) model and the stationary 
Jones model is equivalent to an R 2 obtained from regressing actual accruals on forecast 
accruals in the test period for each firm sep_arately with two restrictions. The first 
restriction is that the slope in the regression be one and the second restriction is that the 
intercept in the regression be zero. For each sample firm and prediction model, data from 
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the estimation period are used to estimate the parameters that are needed to make 
forecasts for the four-year prediction period. Actual accruals in those five years are then 
plotted against forecast accruals. Forecast accuracy is measured by the sum o~ squared 
forecast errors, 1:(Actual-Forecast)2. The R2 value is computed as follows: 
2 ESS;, L (Actual-Forecast) 2 R =1-~~=1-~~~~~~~~~~ 
TSSi, L ( Actual - MeanAccrual) 2 (14) 
where, 
ES Sit= Actual total accruals of firm i during period t of the test period less forecasted 
accruals for firm i during period t obtained from either the Jones (1991) or 
the stationary Jones model; and 
TSSit = Actual total accruals of firm i during period t of the test period less the mean 
accrual for firm i during the four years of the test period. 
This allows the forecast errors from the Jones (1991) or the stationary Jones model to be 
represented by the residuals of the regression line, and the sum of squared forecast errors 
is equal to the conventional error sum of squares. This,error sum of squares is normally 
compared to the total variation in actual accruals, or total sum of squares. Total sum of 
squares is measured by the sum of the squared deviations of the four actual accrual 
numbers fromtheir mean. The conventional R2 is then equal to the squared deviations of 
the four actual accrual numbers from their mean. 
An R2 value equal to zero implies that the forecast values perform as well as a 
naive constant forecast equal to the mean accrual for all years. A positive value ofR2 is 
obtained if the sum of squared forecast errors is less than the sum of squared deviations 
from the mean actual accrual. A negative value ofR2 suggests that simply using the 
mean actual accrual as a forecast for all years for that firm outperforms the discretionary 
53 
accruals from the prediction model (i.e., the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones 
model). 
Since the mean accrual for all years is not known until the last period of the test 
period, a fourth measure of model accuracy is represented by a pseudo adjusted R 2 that 
compares the forecast against a nai:ve constant forecast equal to -5% of total assets for all 
firms for all years in the test period. In other words, this fourth measure of model 
accuracy, the pseudo adjusted R2 compares the error sum of squares against an alternative 
total sum of squares that is computed by taking the sum of squared deviations of the four 
actual accrual numbers from -5% of total assets for the firm for each year as follows: 
2 ESSit L (Actual -Forecast) 2 R =1-~-=l-~~~~~~~~ 
a TSSi, L (Actual -MeanAccrual)2 (15) 
where, 
ES Sit= Actual total accruals of firm i during period t of the test period less forecasted 
accruals for firm i during period t obtained from either the Jones (1991) or 
the stationary Jones model; and 
TS Sit= Actual total accruals of firm i during period t of the test period less the -5% of 
total assets of firm i during year t of the test period. 
The four measures of accuracy described above provide some insights regarding 
the accuracy of the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones model. These measures 
together allow for an evaluation of hypothesis one regarding the accuracy of the 
discretionary accrual models. 
54 
5.3.2 Tests of the Accrual Anomaly 
The accrual anomaly is evaluated using the techniques of Xie (2001) and Sloan 
(1996). The accrual anomaly is evaluated using both the Jones (1991) model and the 
stationary Jones model. Both models ~e being used to evaluate the accrual anomaly to 
determine if there is a difference in the results that depends on the accuracy of the model 
and to assure that the anomaly documented in prior literature exists with the Jones (1991) 
model. 
5.3.2.1 Mishkin (1983) Test 
Mishkin (1983) developed an approach to test the rational expectations hypothesis 
in macroeconomics. The Mishkin test is used to investigate whether the market rationally 
prices discretionary accruals with respect to their one-year-ahead earnings implications. 
The following regression system is estimated: 
where: 
(16) 
EARN1 = earnings in year t ; 
CF01 = cash flows from operations in year t ; 
SIZEA1Rt = size-adju~ted abnormal returns = the difference between a firm's 
annual buy-and-hold returns and the buy-and-hold returns for the 
same 12-month period on the market-capitalization-based portfolio 
decile to which the firm belongs 
NDAt = nondiscretionary accruals in year t; 
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DAt = discretionary accruals in year t; 
Vi+ 1 and et+ 1 = error terms; 
Equation ( 16) is a forecasting equation that estimates the forecasting coefficients 
(ys) of cash flows from operations, nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals 
for predicting the subsequent year's earnings. Equation (17) is a valuation equation that 
estimates the valuation coefficients (y*s) that the market assigns to the components of 
earnings (Le., CFO, NDA and DA) relative to the firms size-adjusted abnormal return. 
As in Mishkin (1983), both equations are estimated jointly using an iterative generalized 
nonlinear least squares estimation procedure, proceeding in two steps .. First, both 
equations are estimated without imposing any constraints on the coefficients ys and y*s. 
To test whether the valuation coefficients are statistically different from the forecasting 
coefficients obtained in the first step, the second step jointly estimates both equations 
imposing the rational pricing constraint that y* q = yq (q = 1,2, and/or 3) .. Mishkin shows 
that under the null hypothesis that the market rationally prices one or more earnings 
components with respect to their impact on the subsequent year's earnings, and that the 
· following likelihood ratio statistic: 
. 2NLn(SSR01SSR"); 
is asymptotically.-·1.;(q) distributed where: 
q = the number of rational pricing constraints imposed; 
N = the number of observations; 
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Ln = natural log; 
SSRc = sum -of squared residuals from the constrained regressions in the second 
step; 
SSRu = sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained regressions in the first 
step. 
If tµe likelihood ratio statistic above is sufficiently large, the null hypothesis of rational 
pricing of one or more earnings components (i.e., y* q = yq, q = 1, _2, and/or 3) is rejected. 
The iterative joint nonlinear estimation procedure of the two equations is 
performed using the SAS/NLIN nonlinear estimation procedure (SAS Institute 1999). 
The program estimates over the test periods the model consisting of the forecasting 
equation (16) and the valuation equation (17). The cross-equation restrictions are that the 
yq are identical in (16) and (17). The procedure is to stack the data so that the system of 
two linear equations, (16) and (17), can be written as orte equation with the appropriate 
nonlinear constraints. 
5.3.2.2 Hedge Portfolio Test · 
The accrual anomaly is also evaluated using the results of the hedge portfolio test 
following Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). Theory suggests that if the market is efficient, 
then investors will price the components of earnings according to their persistence. 
However, prior research has shown that investors do not p·rice the accrual components of 
earnings according to their persistence. ·If the accrual anomaly exists then the stock 
prices of firms with negative discretionary accruals would theoretically be lower than 
their intrinsic values. That is, they would be undervalued. On the other hand, the stock 
prices of firms with positive discretionary accruals will be higher than their intrinsic 
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values. That is, these stocks will be overvalued. If a trading strategy that is long in the 
decile with the most negative discretionary accruals (i.e., the most undervalued firms) 
and short in the decile with ~he most positive discretionary accruals (i.e., the most 
overvalued firms) yields positive abnormal returns in subsequent years, then this would 
further support the notion that the market overprices the discretionary accrual component 
of earnings in the portfolio formation year. 
Firms are grouped into portfolio deciles each year based on their ranking of 
discretionary accruals. A hedge portfolio is formed that is long in the most negative 
discretionary accrual decile and short in the most positive discretionary accrual decile. 
The size adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio decile is computed and t~statistics 
are also computed based on the null hypothesis that the return to the portfolio is equal to 
zero. 
The results of the Mishkin (1_983) test and the hedge portfolio test allow an 
assessment of hypothesis two regarding the pricing of the components of earnings. If the 
market is efficient with respect to the discretionary accrual component of earnings and 
those amounts are measured more accurately using the stationary Jones model, then the 
results of the Mishkin (1983) test and the hedge portfolio test should reveal that the 
accrual anomaly exists when the discretionary accrual component of earnings is 
estimated using the Jones ( 1991) model and not with the stationary Jones model. 
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CHAPTER6 
6. RESULTS 
The purpose of this research is to develop a new discretionary accrual model and 
to test the ~ccrual anomaly with the new model. This chapter will proceed first with the 
evaluation of the discretionary accrual models and then the tests of the accrual anomaly. 
Once the models are tested, the accrual anomaly is tested with both the Jones ( 1991) 
model and the improved model (i.e., stationary Jones model). Testing with both models 
provides a benchmark for comparing the results of tests of the accrual anomaly. 
6.1 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUAL MODELS 
The descriptive statistics for the estimates of the coefficients for the Jones (1991) 
. . 
model and the stationary Jones model are reported in Table 21. Theoretically, the· 
coefficient on the change in revenues (AREV) should be positive. Sales increases should 
cause proportionate increases in the working capital accounts (i.e., current assets and 
current liabilities) .. This coefficient is positive in both the stationary Jones model and the 
Jones (1991) model. The parameter estimate on gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) is expected to be negative. Depreciation, depletion and amortization should 
increase with increases in the level ofPPE, which in tum decreases total accruals. The 
coefficient on PPE has the expected sign for both models. 
Thomas and Zhang (2000) evaluate the relative performance of discretionary 
accrual models by comparing the distribution of forecast errors across models for the 
same forecast firm year. This effectively allows each firm year to serve as its own 
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control, which holds the level· of true discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals constant 
across the models for each firm year. The structure imposed on discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals forms a link between forecast errors and discretionary accruals 
in the estimation periods (Thomas and Zhang 2000). The forecast errors represent the 
error with which discretionary accruals are measured -by a particular discretionary· accrual 
model. Similar procedures are used to evaluate the stationary Jones model and the Jones 
(1991) model. 
The stationary Jones model is evaluated in relation to the Jones (1991) model 
along four areas. The comparison is between the forecast errors for the test period with 
the test period being two years and then four years. The Jones (1991) model is estimated 
over, first 16 years and then 14 years. For the estimation of the stationary Jones model, 
the data is tested over those same time periods and the model is estimated over the 
longest stable time series of observations prior to the test period. 
The first comparison is between the foreca~t errors of the two models for the test 
period. The forecast errors are computed by comparing the forecasts of the models with 
actual accruals during the two and four year periods. The dispersion of the forecast errors 
are compared among models as a measure of accuracy. The forecast errors are shown in 
Panel A of Table 22. The mean forecast error for the Jones (1991) model estimated over 
16 and 14 yearsis-0.0089 and-0.0822, respectively. The mean forecast errors of the 
stationary Jones (1991) model are-0.0016 and-0.0442. These forecast errors are 
obtained by testing the ~stimation time series (i.e., 16 year and 14 year estimation 
periods) using the TIMV AR program to detect any periods ofnonstationarity. When 
structural shifts are discovered by TIMV AR, the program tests the time series subsequent 
.) 
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to the instability. This process is repeated until a stationary estimation period is 
determined prior to the test period. The stationary data prior to the test period are used to 
estimate the stationary Jones model and the forecast errors are computed for the test 
period. Sonie firms do not have a stationary period of sufficient length prior to the test 
period to allow estimation of the stationary Jones model. These firms are removed from 
the sample prior to estimation of both the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones 
. model. 
The forecast errors of the Jones (1991) model have a standard deviation of 12.6 
percent and 17.4 percent of total assets for the two-year and four-year test periods, 
respectively. Whereas the forecast errors of the stationary Jones model have a standard 
deviation of 11.1 percent and IO .9 percent of total assets for the same forecast periods. 
Thus, the forecast errors of the stationary Jones model are smaller than the forecast errors·· 
of the Jones (1991) model that has not been corrected for any structural shifts. The 
stationary Jones model and the Jones (1991) model have similar spreads between the 10th 
and 90th percentiles and similar interquartile ranges. The spread between the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the Jones (1991) model are from-13.3 percent to 10.5 percent (23.8 
percent) and from-19.8 percent to 3.5 percent (23.23 percent). The spread between the 
I 0th and 90th percentiles of the stationary Jones model are from -11. 0 percent to 9. 9 
percent (20.8 percent) and from -6.9 percent to 15.6 percent (22.42 percent). The 
interquartile range of the Jones (1991) model is from-5.7 percent to 4.1 percent (9.8 
percent) and-12.6 percent to-2.1 percent (10.5 percent). The interquartile range of the 
stationary Jones model is from-4.5 percent to 4.9 percent (9.4 perce~t) and from-1.4 
percent to 10.4 percent (11.8 percent). Comparisons between the two models, based on 
61 
) 
measures of dispersion, indicate that the· stationary Jones model is more accurate than the 
Jones (1991) model that has not been corrected for nonstationarity. The stationary Jones 
(1991) model has the lowest standard deviation of forecast errors. The interquartile 
range, and spread between the 10th and 90th percentiles appear to be very similar between 
' 
the two models. Correcting for structural shifts in the time-series data appears to improve 
the ability of the stationary Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
The second evaluation of accuracy is based on firm-specific rankings. For each 
firm in a sample, the models are ranked based on the sum of squared forecast error for all 
years with forecasts in the test period. Since this approach uses within-firm ranks it 
offers a different perspective than the first test, above, because it ignores the magnitude 
of the differences. This test favors models that perform well for most firms, perhaps by a 
small margin, and not perform well occasionally (even ifby a large margin) (Thomas and 
Zhang 2000). 
As shown in Panel B of Table 22, the Jones (1991) model has smaller sum of 
squared forecast errors for 45.4 percent and 31.8 percent of the firms in the sample for the 
16 and 14 year estimation periods, respectively, whereas the stationary Jones model has 
the smaller sum of squared forecast errors for the remaining 54.6 percent and 68.2 
percent of the firms for the two year and four year test periods. The stationary Jones 
model resulted in smaller sum of squared forecast errors on the majority of firms over the 
Jones (1991) model, which indicates that the stationary Jones model is better specified_ 
than the Jones (1991) model that is not corrected for structural shifts in the time-series 
data. 
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A pseudo-R 2 is computed for the prediction period as a third measure of accuracy. 
The pseudo-R2 is equivalent to an R2 obtained from regressing actual accruals on forecast 
accruals in the prediction period, for each firm separately with two restrictions. The first 
restriction is that the slope is equal to one and the second is that the intercept be zero:. A 
positive value ofR2 is·obtained Wthe sum of squared forecast errors is less than the sum 
of squared deviations from the mean actual accrual. A negative value ofR2 suggests that 
simply using the mean actual accrual as a forecast for all years for that firm outperforms 
the accruals from that prediction model (Thomas and Zhang 2000). Note that in Panel C 
(and in Panel D) of Table 22, measures of distributional dispersion (i.e., standard . 
deviations, interquartile ranges, etc.) are not used as indicators of forecast accuracy as in 
Panel A. A more important indicator of performance here is the fraction of firms that 
have a positive R 2• 
Panel C of Table 22 shows that the stationary Jones model's performance exceeds 
the performance of the Jones (1991) model based on the pseudo R2. Fifty-one percent 
and 57 percenJ of the firms have a positive ps.eudo R2 for the two test periods as 
measured on the forecast errors of the Jones (1991) model, but 62 percent and 79 percent 
of those firms have a positive pseudo R 2 when the model is estimated with stationary data 
for the two test periods. Both of these compare favorably to the model evaluation 
performed by Thomas and Zhang (2000} 
Thomas and Zhang (2000) point out that requiring a positive R2 value in the 
prediction period may be a bit difficult for the models to achieve. A positive R2 means 
the model in question outperforms a naive model, which predicts that accruals are equal 
to the mean accrual for each firm over the prediction period. Given that the mean accrual 
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for each firm is not known until the last year's accrual is reported, this benchmark may be 
unreasonably high. The fourth test, which is less demanding, is to compare the accuracy 
of the model in question against a na1ve benchmark that forecasts total accruals equal to 
-5 percent oflast period's assets for all firms for all years as in Thomas and Zhang 
(2000). The -5 percent value is based on the average total accruals for the sample during 
period. The mean actual accruals for the sample over the test period is -4 and -8 percent. 
These results are consistent with the model evaluation of Thomas and Zhang {2000). The 
results of this measure of accuracy are reported in Panel D of Table 22. Both models 
performed extremely well when compared to a na1ve prediction model that estimates that 
total accruals are -5 percent of total assets. One-hundred percent of all firms had positive 
pseudo R 2 values, with a mean value near one for both models. This measure is also 
conducted assuming forecast accruals equal to 0.5, 1, 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 percent without any 
significant difference in the results. Both models perform very well based on the pseudo 
R 2 that compares the forecasts against a na1ve model that predicts total accruals equal to 
-5 percent of total assets. 
Overall, the stationary Jones model outperformed the Jones {1991) model. The 
dispersion measure favors the stationary Jones model, as the standard deviations of the 
forecast errors are smaller. Further, the sum of squared forecast errors are smaller for a 
larger percentage of the firms that are estimated using stationary data, and finally, based 
on the pseudo R 2, where the forecasts of the models are compared to the difference 
between the mean accrual amount, the stationary Jones model produced a larger number 
of firms that had positive R2s. The correction for nonstationary periods·improves model 
performance. 
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6.2 THE ACCRUAL ANOMALY 
The accrual anomaly is evaluated using the techniques of Xie (2001) and Sloan 
(1996). Both Xie and Sloan evaluated the pricing of accruals using the Mishkin (1983) 
test and hedge portfolio tests. Both evaluation techniques (i.e., Mishkin testand hedge 
portfolios) are used with the discretionary accrual predictions of both the Jones (1991) 
model and the stationary Jones model. The purpose of using both models to evaluate the 
accrual anomaly is to determine if there is a difference in the results that depends on the 
accuracy of the model and to assure that the anomaly documented in prior literature exists 
with the Jones ( 1991) modeL 
6.2.1 Mishkin (1983) Test 
Panel A of Table 23 reports the coefficient estimates for equations (16) and (17) 
obtained in the first stage using the estimates of discretionary accruals o~tained from both 
the Jones ( 1991) model and the stationary Jones model. For cash from operations, the 
valuation coefficient is 0.82 (i.e., 1*1 = 0.82) and the forecasting coefficient is 0.94 ('Y1 = 
0.94) for the Jones (1991) model. For the stationary Jones model, the valuation 
coefficient on cash flows of0.39 is very close to the forecasting coefficient of 0.43. 
Smaller valuation coefficients (1*1 < 11) indicate that the market underprices the cash 
flows from operations relative to its ability to forecast one-year-ahead earnings. To test 
whether the underpricing is statistically significant, equations (16) and (17) are jointly 
estimated again in the second stage for both the Jones ( 1991) model and the stationary 
Jones model, after imposing t_he rational pricing constraint that 1*1 = 11. The likelihood 
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ratio statistic reported in Panel B of Table 23 is insignificant for the Jones (1991) model 
and the stationary Jones model. The ratio statistic for the Jones ( 1991) model is O. 63 
(p=0.42) for the Jones (1991) model and for the stationary Jones model is 0.99 (p=0.32), 
which indicates that the underpricing of cash flows from operations (y*1 < 11) is 
statistically insignificant. This result for both the Jones (1991) model and the stationary 
Jones model is consistent with the notion of rational pricing of the cash flows from 
operations component of earnings relative to its ability to predict one-year-ahead earnings. 
Panel A of Table 23 shows that the valuation coefficients that the market assigns 
to nondiscretionary accruals (1*2) and discretionary accruals ('Y*3) are 0.46 and 0.68, 
respectively with estimates of discretionary accruals using the Jones ( 1991) model and 
0.64 and 0.47 respectively with estimates of discretionary accruals using the stationary 
Jones model. With estimates of discretionary accruals from both models (i.e., Jones 
( 1991) model and the stationary Jones model), the coefficients from the valuation 
equations. are larger than there forecasting counterparts. The forecasting coefficients for 
nondiscretionary accruals (12) and discretionary accruals (13) with estimates of 
discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) model are 0.22 and 0.38 respectively, and 
with estimates from the stationary Jones model the estimates from the forecasting 
equation for nondiscretionary accruals (12) and discretionary accruals (y3) are 0.64 and 
0.46. Larger coefficients on nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals in the 
valuation equation indicates that the market overprices both relative to their ability to 
predict one-year-ahead earnings. 
To test whether the overpricing is statistically significant, the equations are 
estimated again forcing the valuation coefficients and the forecasting coefficients to be 
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· equal. Panel B of Table 23 reports that the likelihood ratio statistics reject the null 
hypotheses of rational pricing of nondiscretionary accruals (y*2 = 12) using estimates of 
discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model but not the stationary Jones 
model (p < 0.08 and p=0.22, respectively).. Similarly, Panel B of Table 23 reports that 
the likelihood ratio statistics reject the null hypotheses of rational pricing discretionary 
accruals relative to their ability to predict one-year-ahead earnings with estimates of 
discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones ( 1991) model but not the stationary Jones 
model (p = 0.001 and p = 0.15, respectively). These results indicate that the market 
. significantly overprices nondiscretionary accruals ( y* 2 > y2) and· discretionary accruals 
(y*3 > y3) for the Jones (1991) model but not the stationary Jones model. The overpricing 
of accruals of the Jones ( 1991) model appears to be more severe for the estimates of 
discretionary accruals than for nondiscretionary accruals because the likelihood ratio 
statistic for the null hypothesis that y*2 = Y2 and y*3 = y3 is 15.91 (p = 0.0004). However, 
the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary Jones model still 
show no signs ofinefficiency with a likelihood ration statistic of2.13 (p = 0.35) for the 
null hypothesis that y*2 == Y2 and y*3 = y3. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic for the 
rational pricing of all components of earnings (i.e;, cash flows from operations; 
. . 
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals) rejects the null of y*1 = y1, y*2 = y2 
and y*3 = y3 using estimates of discretionary accrual from the Jones (1991) model but not 
the stationary Jones model with likelihood ratio statistics of 16.40 and 2.13, respectively 
for the two models' estimates (p = 0.0009 and p == 0.55). All the results from the Mishkin 
(1983) indicate market inefficiency with respect to the discretionary accrual 
measurements obtained from the Jones (1991) model but not the stationary Jones model. 
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It is the contention of this research that the mispricing documented here using the 
Mishkin (1983) test on estimates of discretionary accruals is due to poor measurement of 
discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model. When the discretionary 
accruals are measured with a better-specified model, the stationary Jones model, the 
accrual anomaly no longer exists. 
It is shown in the evaluation of the discretionary accrual models that the estimates 
of discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary Jones model are more accurate that 
the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model. The results 
from the Mishkin (1983) test indicate that the accrual anomaly persists when the Jones 
(1991) model is used to measure discretionary accruals. However, when more accurate 
estimates of discretionary accruals are obtained from the stationary Jones model the 
accrual anomaly no longer exists. The evidence is consistent with Xie (2001) when the 
e~timates of discretionary accruals are obtained from the Jones ( 1991) model, which 
suggests that presence of the accrual anomaly is the result ofmismeasurement of 
discretionary accruals. 
6.2.2 Hedge Portfolios 
The results of the Mishkin (1983) te~t suggest that the accrual anomaly 
documented by Xie (2001) may be the result of a poorly specified model of discretionary 
accruals. The next test of the accrual anomaly using both models constructs a hedge 
portfolio based on the relative level of discretionary accruals, with discretionary accruals 
being predicted by both models. The economic significance of deviations from market 
efficiency can be assessed by examining the returns of a trading strategy based on the 
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relative magnitude of the discretionary accrual component of earnings (Sloan 1996). If 
the accrual anomaly exists, the stock prices of firms with relatively lower levels of 
discretionary accruals should be lower than their intrinsic values (i.e., undervalued). 
Alternatively, the stock prices of firms with higher levels of discretionary accruals should 
be higher than their intrinsic values (i.e., overvalued). If hedge portfolios that are long in 
firms.in the lowest decile of discretionary accruals and short in the highest decile of 
discretionary accruals earn positive abnormal returns in subsequent years, then this would 
further support the prior research that indicates that the market overprices discretionary 
accruals in the portfolio formation year (Xie 2001) (i.e., there is an accrual anomaly). , 
Firms in the sample are ranked according to the relative magnitude of the 
discretionary accrual component of earnings and assigned, in equal numbers, to ten 
, portfolios each year. A separate abnormal return is then computed for each portfolio for 
each of the four years in the test period. The hedge portfolio test is also conducted with 
estimates of discretionary accl,"llals obtained from both models estimated over 16 years, 
providing two years of discretionary accrual estimates. Table 24 reports the average of 
the two returns for each portfolio for the 16 year estimation procedure, along with the t-
statistic computed from the two-year time-series. Abnormal returns are provided for each 
of the three subsequent years, where the return cumulation period begins four months 
after the fiscal year in which accruals are measured. The hedge portfolio is long in firms 
in the bottom decile of relative discretionary accruals and short in firms in the top decile 
of relative discretionary accruals. Abnormal returns to·the hedge portfolio would be an 
indication of market inefficiency with respect to the discretionary accrual component of 
earnings. 
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The hedge portfolio results for the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones 
model are reported in Table 24 for the 16 year estimation procedure and Table 25 for the 
14 year estimation procedure. The numbers in parentheses are two-tailed t-statistics 
based on the mean and standard deviations of the time-series, where a significant t-
statistic indicates the return is significantly different from zero at the indicated p-value. 
The hedge portfolios formed with the two year test period yield positive returns 
for all years subsequent to portfolio formation (i.e., t+l and t+2) for the Jones (1991) 
model, and those returns are statistically significant in both years. However, the hedge 
portfolio returns for the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary 
Jones model are insignificant in both years. The hedge portfolio returns for the hedge 
portfolios based on estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones ( 1991) 
model are 10.9 percent int+ 1, 16.5 percent in t+2 with t-statistics of l.88 and 2.52, 
respectively for the two years. These results imply that the market misprices the 
discretionary accrual component of earnings relative to its persistence when the estimates 
of discretionary accruals are obtained from the Jones ( 1991} model. The same conclusion 
cannot be reached, however, with the hedge portfolios formed based on the estimates of 
discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary Jones model. The returns for the 
hedge portfolios based on the stationary estimates of discretionary accruals for years t+ 1 
and t+2 are 3.8 percent (t = 0.56), 7.8 percent (t = 1.17), respectively. Based on the 
results of the hedge portfolio tests, it appears that the accrual anomaly persists with 
estimates of discretionary accruals measured using the Jones ( 1991) model but not with 
/ 
estimates of discretionary accruals obtained using the stationary Jones model. 
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The hedge portfolio results for the models estimated over 14 years (i.e., four year 
test periods) are shown in Table 25. The portfolio data suggests the accrual anomaly 
exists with the estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones ( 1991) model. 
The returns in year t+ 1 are significantly positive for the two deciles at the bottom of 
relative discretionary accruals and they are significantly negative for the two deciles 
containing firms with the highest levels of discretionary accruals. Further, the return to 
the hedge portfolio for year t+ 1 based on discretionary accruals from the Jones ( 1991) is 
significantly positive at 16.9 percent (t=2.32). With the discretionary accruals obtained 
from the Jones (1991) model the accrual anomaly persists. However, there is more. 
evidence that the accrual anomaly is a result of mismeasurement of the discretionary 
accruals. The are no signs of the accrual anomaly based on the deciles formed on the 
basis of discretiopary accruals estimated by the stationary Jones model. There is no 
apparent trend in the returns of the deciles suggesting market inefficiency with respect to 
discretionary accruals and the return to the hedge portfolio is not significantly different 
from zero at 2.6 percent (t=0.19). Based on the measurement of discretionary accruals 
obtained from the stationary Jones model the accrual anomaly is nonexistent. Since the · 
measurement. of discretionary accruals from the stationary Jones model has been shown 
to be more accurate than those of the Jones (1991) model and since the accrual anomaly 
is nonexistent with the more accmate measurements, there is strong evidence that the 
previous findings of the anomaly are due to measurement error in the measurement of 
accruals. The market proves itself to be efficient in the pricing of discretionary accruals 
when those accruals are measure more accurately. Support is found for the second 
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hypothesis that the market does correctly price the discretionary accrual component of 
earnings according to its persistence. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This research addresses two areas of the accrual anomaly. First, the most popular 
discretionary accrual model is evaluated for the effects of nonstationary periods and 
managerial discretion during the e~timation period of the Jones {1991) mo~el. From this 
analysis emerged a stationary Jones model that is estimated using the longest time series 
of stable data prior to the test period .. Empirical testing provided'support that the 
stationary Jones model produced more accurate estimates of discretionary accruals. The 
dispersion of the forecast errors favored the stationary Jones model. The sum of squared 
forecast errors are smaller for the stationary Jones model for a majority of the sample 
firms and a larger number of the firms had positive pseudo R2s with the stationary Jones 
model than the Jones ( 1991) model. Based on the tests of the model, it is shown that 
removing the nonstationary periods and/or management discretion during the estimation 
period improves model accuracy. Thus, support is found for the first hypothesis that the 
estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary Jones model are more 
accurate than those obtained from the Jones {1991) model that has not been corrected for 
nonstationarity and managerial discretion during the estimation period. 
Both models are then used to test the accrual anomaly. The accrual anomaly that 
has persisted in prior research is that the market does not price the discretionary accrual 
component of earnings based on its persistence. Discretionary accruals are thought to be 
the result of an attempt by management to inflate or manage earnings in· order to fool the 
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market. However, if the market is truly efficient it should not be fooled. Possible 
reasons for the anomaly are that the market is inefficient with respect to discretionary 
accruals or it may be that the anomaly exists because the methods of measuring 
discretionary accruals are misspecified. The accrual anomaly is tested with the Jones 
(1991) model and the stationary Jones model. Since the stationary Jones model has been 
shown to be more accurate than the Jones (1991) model that has not been corrected for 
structural shifts in the time-series data, if the anomaly persists with the Jones (1991) 
model but not the stationary Jones model it is an indication that the anomaly is the result 
of errors in the measurement of discretionary accruals. When the anomaly is tested with 
both models it persisted with the discretionary accruals estimated with the Jones (1991) 
model but not with the more accurate discretionary accruals obtained with the stationary 
Jones model. Thus, there is strong evidence that the anomalous results obtained from 
priorresearch is due to the mismeasurement of the discretionary accruals being tested. 
Thus, support is found for the second hypothesis that the market correctly prices the 
discretionary accrual component of earnings according to its persistence. It is impossible 
to earn abnormal returns based on the level of discretionary accruals and thus, the market 
does correctly price this component of earnings. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation examines the Jones ( 1991) model of discretionary accruals and 
attempts to discover a more accurate method of estimating discretionary accruals. The 
Jones ( 1991) model uses time-series data to make predictions of total accruals for the test 
period. Any difference between actual accruals and the predicted accruals of the model is 
deemed to be due to management discretion. Howerver, the Jones (1991) model is 
subject to making erroneous estimates of discretioanry accruals because the time-series · 
data may contain structural shifts that cause estimates of total accruals to be wrong, and 
thus the estimates of discretionary accruals would also be wrong. Another·weakness of 
the Jones (1991) model is that it assumes that discretionary accruals do not exist in the 
estimation period of the model. If there are any discretionary accruals in the estimation 
period, the prediction of total accruals of the model will contain a prediction for expected 
nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals. Thus, the estimate of managerial discretion 
for the test period will be incorrect. 
This dissertation hypothesizes that by controlling for nonstationarity in the 
estimation period of the model and controlling for the probable managerial discretion that 
exists in the estimation period that the Jones (1991) modelwill provide more accurate 
estimates of discretionary accruals. A hypothetical data set was created that allowed for 
the manipulation of the data to test the accuracy of the Jones {1991) model with various 
assumptions about nondiscretionary and discretionary structural shifts in the estimation 
period of the model. A stationary Jones model was developed that used the techniques of 
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Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) to test for nonstationary periods in the estimation of the 
Jones (1991) model. The model was then estimated for the sample firms over the longest 
time-series prior to the test period that was stable. This hypothesis was tested by 
evaluating common statistical measures of dispersion. The measures of dispersion were 
compared between the Jones (1991) model and the stationary Jones model. The Jones 
(1991) model was used as a benchmark because of its prevalence in accounting research. 
Based on the measures of dispersion, there is an improvement in the estimates of 
discretionary accruals provided by the Jones model when the nonstationary periods are 
removed from the estimation period. The stationary Jones model outperformed the Jones 
model. 
This dissertation is also concerned with the accrual anomaly. Prior research 
shows that the market does not price the discretionary accrual component of earnings 
according to its persistence. Since this information is publicly available, the accrual 
anomaly documents an instance of market inefficiency. The accrual anomaly implies that 
management can manage earnings by using discretionary accruals and that the market 
will be fooled. Possible causes of the anomaly are that the market it truly inefficient or 
that the methods and tests used to test the anomaly are inappropriate. This dissertation 
hypothesizes that a possible cause of the accrual anomaly is the mismeasurement of 
discretionary accruals. 
The improved estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from the stationary 
Jones model are then used to test the anomaly along with the estimates of discretionary 
accruals obtained from the Jones (1991) model. The estimates of both models are used to 
test the accrual anomaly so the results can be compared between the two models. The 
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accrual anomaly was tested using the same methods as those used by prior research that 
documents the anomaly. Xie (2001) and Sloan (1996) document the anomaly using the 
Mishkin (1983) test and a hedge portfolio test. The results of both tests document the 
anomaly with the discretionary accruals estimated by the Jones (1991) model but not the 
stationary Jones model. Thus, the tests indicate that the market does correctly price 
discretionary accruals when the estimates of discretionary accruals are obtained from the · 
Jones model that controls for the effects of nonstationarity and for possible managerial 
discretion during the estimation period of the model. Support was found for hypothesis 
two that the market correctly prices discretionary accruals. However, this result was not 
found when the model used to estimate discretionary accruals was not correct for 
nonstationarity. 
7.2 LIMITATIONS 
This research uses a simplified hypothetical data set to test the accuracy of the . 
Jones (1991) model when there are nondiscretionary and discretionary structural shifts in 
the time-series used to estimate the model. From this analysis it is believed that structural 
shifts in the time-series and managerial discretion cause the estimates of the model to be 
inaccurate. Based on this conclusion, a stationary Jones model was developed that tested 
the time-series data used to estimate the model for nonstationary periods. The stationary 
Jones model produced more accurate estimates of discretionary accruals. The 
hypothetical data set used for this analysis had many simplifying assumptions to allow 
for manipulation and testing. These simplifying assumptions limit the external validity of 
the results. However, the empirical testing using real data of the sample firms indicates 
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that the stationary Jones model does outperform the Jones model estimated without 
correcting for instability in the data and managerial discretion during the estimation 
period. 
Because the Jones ( 1991) mo;del relies on time-series data, the sample used in this 
dissertation was made up of firms that were in existence for the entire time the models . 
were estimated and tested. Consequently, external validity is limited because the firms in 
this study have remained in business for 20 plus years. The estimates of discretionary 
accruals of the stationary Jones model may not be as accurate when the model is used on 
firms that have shorter life spans. Further, internal validity is also limited because the 
sample firms are generally larger successful firms. The model performance may not be 
as good when the model is used on smaller firms that are less successful. 
The accrual anomaly was tested using the Mishkin (1983) test. The results of the 
Mishkin test suggests that the market does correctly price discretionary accnials 
according to their persistence and that the anomaly is the result of the discretionary 
accrual model being used. Recently, the Mishkin test has come under criticism because 
of its use with panel data of the type contained in accounting research. Kraft, Leone and 
Wasley (2001) criticize use of the Mishkin test across multiple firms with cross-sectional 
data or pooled time-series data because that was not its intended use. They claim that the 
assumption that the errors of the two equations in the Mishkin test are the same is 
violated using cross-sectional or pooled time-series data. Further, they point out that if 
the Mishkin test is used across firms that the test then erroneously assigns the same 
forecasting coefficients to every firm being tested. They provide that the Mishkin test 
' 
was intended to be used with a single time-series such as interest rates. While these 
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criticisms may be valid, the results of the Mishkin test were confirmed by the results of 
the hedge portfolio tests. Based on the fact that alternate testing provided the exact same . 
result, it. would appear that some of the criticisms of the Mishkin test with cross sectional 
and pooled time-series data may be overstated. 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The techniques of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) contained in the TIMV AR 
program proved to be very accurate at identifying structural shifts in the time-series data. 
The structural shifts may or may not be the result of managerial discretion during the 
estimation period of the model. These techniques may prove to be very useful in 
estimating· managerial discretion in future research. Research that could test the market 
pricing of the structural shift may provide greater insight into the market's pricing of 
discretionary accruals. This could allow for the inclusion of a larger number of firms in 
the sample because it may lessen the length of time-series data necessary for estimation 
of the model. -
The Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) techniques may also be us~ful for testing 
the time-series of firms that have been subject to restatement in the past to see if the 
TIMV AR program can identify managerial discretion deemed to be abusive by regulating 
authorities. The accuracy of the program would be verified if there.were some 
·correlation between the incidence of the shift identified.by the program and the trouble 
encountered by the firm causing the restatement. 
The stationary Jones model has many possible uses in future research. The Jones 
( 1991) model has been prev~ent in accounting research testing the pricing of accruals 
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and earnings management since it was developed. Using a better specified model to test 
in these areas may provide different results than those achieved using a flawed model. 
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0 1 2 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 
CommE:xp 800 820 841 
BID Exp~nse 100 103 105 
Depree. 250 250 250 
1150 H73 1196 
00 
w NI 850 878 906 
Cash 700 1818 2963 
AIR 400 410 420 
PPB 5000 5001 5002 
AID (250) (500) (750) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 
R/E 0 850 1728 
Inc 850 878 906 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 
CFO 1118 1145 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 
TABLEl 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- STATIONARY 
3 4 5 6 7 
1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 
538 552 566 580 594 
2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 
862 883 905 928 951 
108 110 113 116 119 
250 250 250 250 250 
1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 
935 964 995 1026 1058 
4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 
431 442 453 464 475 
5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 
(1000) (1250) (1500) p750} (2000) 
8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 
5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 
2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 
935. 964 995 1026 1058 
8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 
1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 
-239.49 -239.23 -238.96 · -238.69 -238.40 
"' 
8 9 10 11 
1828 1873 1920 1968 
609 624 640 656 
2437 2498 2560 2624 
975 999 1024 1050 
122 125 128 131 
250 250 250 250 
1347 1374 1402 1431 
1090 1124 1158 1193 
10463 11824 13220 14650 
487 500 512 525 
5008 5009 5010 5011 
(2250} (2500) {2750} (3000) 
13708 14833 15992 17186 
5008 5009 5010 5011 
7610 8700 9824 10982 
1090 1124 1158 1193 
13708 14833 15992 17186 
1328 1362 1396 1430 
-238.11 -237.82 -237.51 -237.20 
{/:'.\ 
12 13 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 
Cr. Sales 672 689 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 
CommExp 1076 1103 
BID Expense 134 138 
Depree. 250 250 
1460 1491 
00 
~ NI 1229 1266 
Cash 16117 17619 
AIR 538 551 
PPE 5012 5013 
ND (3250) {3500) 
Assets 18416 19684 
Contribution 5012 5013 
R/E 12175 13404 
Inc 1229 1266 
L+OE 18416 19684 
CFO 1466 1503 
Accruals -236.88 -236.55 
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- STATIONARY 
14 15 16 17 18 19 
2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 
706 724 742 761 780 799 
2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 
1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 
141 145 148 152 156 160 
250 250 250 250 250 250 
1522 1553 1586 1619 1654 1689 
1304 1343 1383 1424 1466 1509 
19160 20739 22357 24016 25717 27460 
565 579 594 609 624 639 
5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 
(3750) (4000) (4250) (4500) (4750) (5000) 
20989 22333 23717 25142 26609 · 28118 
5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 
14671 15975 17318 18701 20125 21591 
1304 1343 1383 1424 1466 1509 
20989 22333 23717 25142 26609 28118 
1540 1579 1618 . 1659 1700 1743 
-236.21 -235.87 -235.52 -235,15 -234.78 -234.40 
20 21 22 
2458 2519 2582 
819 840 861 
3277 3359 3443 
1311 1344 1377 
164 168 172 
250 250 250 
1725 1762 1799 
1552 1598 1644 
29246 31077 32954 
655 672 689 
5020 5021 5022 
(5250) (5500) (5750) 
29672 31270 32915 
5020 5021 · 5022 
23099 24652 26249 
1552 1598 1644 
29672 31270 32915 
1786 1831 1877 
-234.01 -233.61 -233.20 
TABLE2 
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE JONES (1991) MODEL ESTIMATED 
USING THE STATIONARY HYPOTHETICAL DATA 
ACCRJAssetSit-1 = a i(l/ AssetSit-1) + ~1i(AREVitl AssetSit-t) + ~2i(PPEitl AssetSit-1) (2) 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic 
a 
B1 
~2 
where: 
-238.81 33.90 -7.04 
0.2012 0.00462 43.58 
-0.0025 0.00682 -0.33 
Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA 
-233.30 -233.20 0.10 
ACCRit = Accruals as calculated in equation x in year t for firm i; 
AREVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
8it = error term in year t for firm i; 
85 
p-value 
p <·0.0001 
p < 0.0001 
0.7459 
Actual DA 
0.00 
TABLE3 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITION IN YEAR 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
Comm.Exp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1518 1544 1570 1597 1624 1652 1681 
00 
OI NI 850 878 906 935 964 745 776 808 840 874 908 943 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 1574 2838 4134 5463 6824 8220 9650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004· 10005 10006 10007 10008 10009 10010 10011 
AID (250) (500) (750) (10001- (1250) (1750) (2250) (2750) (3250) (3750) (4250) (4750) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10282 11058 11867 12708 13583 14492 15436 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 · 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5277 6052 6860 7700 8574 9482 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 745 776 808 840 874 908 943 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10282 11058 11867 12708 13583 14492 15436 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -488.96 -488.69 -488.40 -488.11 -487.82 -487.51 -487.20 
. . .. . TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITION IN YEAR 5 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 . 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1710 1741 1772 1803 1836 1869 1904 1939 1975 2012 2049 
00 
'-l NI 979 1016 1054 1093 1133 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
Cash 11117 12619 14160 15739 17357 19016 20717 22460 24246 26077 27954 
NR 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 10012 . 10013 10014 10015 10016 10017 10018 10019 10020 10021 10022 
AID {5250} {5750) {6250) (6750) {7250) F750} {8250) (8750) (9250} {9750} (10250) 
Assets 16416 17434 18489 19583 20717 21892 · 23109 24368 25672 27020 28415 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 _ 5021 5022 
R/E 10425 11404 12421 13475 14568 15701 16875 18091 19349 20652 21999 
Inc 979 1016 .1054 1093 1133 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
L+OE 16416 17434 18489 19583 20717 21892 23109 24368 25672 27020 28415 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -486.88 -486.55 -486.21 -485.87 -485.52 -485.15 -484.78 -484.40 -484.01 -483.61 -48f20 
TABLE4 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITION IN YEAR 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 · 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122) 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 ·250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 500 500 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1652 1681 
00 
00 NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 908 943 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 8220 9650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 10010 10011 
AID (250) (500) (750) (1000) (1250) (1500) (1750) (2000) (2250) (2500) (3000) (3500) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15742 16686 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 · 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 10732 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 908 943 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15742 16686 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -487.51 -487.20 
TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITION 
ASSET ADDITION IN YEAR 10 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1710 1741 1772 1803 1836 1869 1904 1939 1975 2012 2049 
00 
l,O NI 979 1016 1054 1093 1133 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
Cash 11117 12619 14160 15739 17357 19016 20717 22460 24246 26077 27954 
AIR 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 10012 10013 10014 10015 10016 10017 10018 10019 10020 10021 10022 
ND (4000) (4500} {5000) (5500) (6000) (6500) (7000) (7500) (8000) {8500) (9000) 
Assets 17666 18684 19739 20833 21967 23142 24359 25618 26922 28270 29665 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 11675 12654 13671 14725 15818 16951 18125 19341 20599 21902 23249 
Inc 979 1016 1054 1093 1133 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
·L+OE 17666 18684 19739 · . 20833 21967 23142 24359 25618 26922. 28270 29665 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -486.88 -486.55 -486.21 -485.87 -485.52 -485.15 -484.78 -484.40 -484.01 -483.61 -483.20 
TABLES 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITION 
ASSET ADDITION IN YEAR 15 
0 1 2 3 . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1402 1431 
'° 0 NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
NR 400 410 420 431 ·442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 .5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250) (500) (750) (1000~ (1250) {1500) (1750) ·(2000) (2250) {2500} {2750) {3000) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 . 13708 14833 15992 17186 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 · ')824 10982 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -237.51 -237.20 
TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
.HYPOTHETICAL DATA-- NONDISCRETIONARY CHANGE DUE TO ASSET ADDITTON 
ASSET ADDITTON IN YEAR 15 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 • 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 250 250 250 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1460 1491 1522 1803 1836 1869 1904 1939 1975 2012 2049 
'° 
-
NI 1229 1266 1304 1093 1133. 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
Cash 16117 17619 19160 15739 17357 19016 20717 22460 24246 26077 27954 
AIR 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 10015 10016 10017 10018 10019 10020 10021 10022 
AID (3250) (3500} p750} · {4250} {4750) (5250) (5750} (6250) (6750} {7250) (7750} 
Assets 18416 19684 20989 22083 23217 24392 25609 26868 28172 29520 30915 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12175 13404 14671 15975 17068 18201 19375 20591 21849 23152 24499 
Inc 1229 1266 1304 1093 1133 1174 1216 1259 1302 1348 1394 
L+OE 18416 19684 20989 22083 23217 24392 25609 26868 28172 29520 30915 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -236.88 -236.55 -236.21 -485.87 -485.52 -485.15 -484.78 -484.40 -484.01 -483.61 -483.20 
TABLE6 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effects of Nondiscretionary Changes in the Hypothetical Data Set 
N ondiscretionary Change Due to Asset Addition 
Asset Additions in Years 5, 10 and 15 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic p-value 
Asset Addition 
in Period 5 
a -1.51 0.02 -66.46 < 0.0001 
131 0.23 0.0005 440.19 < 0.0001 
132 -0.05 0.000002 -28,910 <0.0001 
Asset Addition 
in Period 10 
a -1.61 0.04 -39.51 < 0.0001 
B1 0.2336 0.0010 229.38 · < 0.0001 
132 -0.05 0.000004 -13,667 < 0.0001 
Asset Addition 
in Period 15 
d. -1.63 0.02 -76.32 < 0.0001 
B1 0.2350 0.0005 450.88 < 0.0001 
132 . -0.05 0.000003 -18,004 < 0.0001 
Estimates of DA 
Addition Year: Predicted TA · Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
Five -483.14 . -483.20 -0.06 0.00 
Ten -483.09 · -483.20 . -0.11 0.00 
Fifteen -483.09 -483.20 -0.11 0.00 
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TABLE7 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 liO 113 116 119 122 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 125 125 . 125 125 125 125 125 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1143 1169 1195 1222 1249 1277 1306 
\0 
u.) NI 850 ·878 906 935 964 1120 1151 1183 1215 1249 1283 1318· 
Cash 700 18i8 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
NR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 .512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250~ {500} (750} (1000} (1250} {1375~ (1500} {1625~ · p750~ (1875} {2000~ {2125~ 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10657 11808 12992 14208 15458 16742 18061 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5652 6802 7985 9200 10449 11732 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 1120 1151 1183 1215 1249 1283 1318 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 . 8571 9536 10657 11808 12992 14208 15458 16742 18061 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 13.96 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -113.96 -113.69 -113.40 -113.11 -112.82 -112.51 -112.20 
TABLE 7 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 5 
12 13 14 15 16 17 . 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 . 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
1335 1366 1397 1428 1461 1494 1529 1564 1600 1637 1674 
IO 
.i:,. NI 1354 1391 . 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
Cash 16117 17619 19160 20739 22357 24016 25717 27460 29246 31077 32954 
AIR 538. 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
AID (22502 {23752 {25002 (2625) (27502 {28752 {3000) (3125) (3250) {3375·2 (3500) 
Assets 19416 20809 22239 23708 25217 26767 28359 29993 31672 33395 35165 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 13050 14404 15796 17225 18693. 20201 21750 23341 24974 26652 28374 
Inc 1354 1391 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
L+OE 19416 20809 22239 23708 25217 26767 28359 29993 31672 33395 35165 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals .-111.88 -111.55 -111.21 -110.87 -110.52 -110.15 -109.78 -109.40 -109.01 -108.61 -108.20 
TABLES 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 . 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122. 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 125 125 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1277 1306 
'-0 
Vl NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1283 1318 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487· 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250) . (500) F50) ~1000) (1250~ p500) (1750) (2000) (2250) (2500) ~2625) .(2750) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16117 17436 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 11107 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1283 1318 · 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16117 17436 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
.Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -112.51 -112.20 
TABLE 8 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA - DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 10 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
Comm.Exp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
1335 1366 1397 1428 1461 1494 1529 1564 1600 1637 1674 
'° 0\ NI 1354 1391 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
Cash 16117 17619 19160 20739 22357 24016 25717 27460 29246 31077 32954 
NR. 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 .655 672 689 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 . 5018 5019 5020 5021 .5022 
AID {2875) (3000) . (3125~ {3250) .(3375~ (3500) (3625} p750) (3875) (4000~ {4125~ 
-Assets 18791 20184 21614 23083 24592 26142 27734 29368 31047 32770 34540 
Contribution · 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12425 13779 15171 16600 18068 19576 21125 22716 24349 26027 27749 
Inc 1354 1391 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
L+OE 18791 20184 21614 23083 24592 26142 27734 29368 31047 32770 34540 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -111.88 -111.55 -111.21 -110.87 -110.52 -110.15 -109.78 -109.40 -109.01 -108.61 -108.20 
TABLE9 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 15 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1402 1431 
'° 1 NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
Cash 700 1818 · 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250) {500} {750) (1000) {1250) {1500} {1750) {2000} {2250} {2500) (2750) (3000) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527. 6552 7610 8700 9824 10982 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 . 15992 17186 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -237.51 -237.20 
TABLE 9 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA - DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 15 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 . 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 . 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 250 250 250 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
1460 1491 1522 1428 1461 1494 1529 1564 1600 1637 1674 
'° 00 NI 1229 1266 1304 1468 1508 1549 1591. 1634 1677 1723 1769 
Cash 16117 17619 19160 20739 · 22357 24016 25717 27460 29246 31077 32954 
AfR 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
AID (3250) (3500) 0750) {3875~ ~4000) (4125) (4250~ (4375) (4500) (4625~ ~4750) 
Assets 18416 19684 20989 22458 23967 25517 27109 28743 30422 · 32145 33915 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12175 13404 14671 15975 17443 18951 20500 22091 23724 25402 27124 
Inc 1229 1266 1304 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
L+OE 18416 19684 20989 22458 23967 25517 27109 28743 30422 · 32145 33915 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -236.88 :-236.55 -236.21 -110.87 -110.52 -110.15 -109.78 -109.40 -109.01 -108.61 -108.20 
TABLE 10 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effects of Discretionary Depreciation Changes in the Hypothetical Data Set 
Discretionary Depreciation Change in Years 5, 10 and 15 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic p-value 
Depree. Change 
in Period 5 
Cl -465,998 103,447 -4:50 0.0003 
B1 -55.6546 13.94 -3.99 0.0009 
P2 93.68658 20.82 4.50 0.0003 
Depree. Change 
in Period 10 
Cl 58,787 95,940 0.61 0.55 
P1 14.13279 12.93 1.09 0.29 
P2 -11.9465 19.31 -0.62 0.54 
Depre~. Change 
in Period 15 
Cl 267,700 56,945 4.70 0.0002 
P1 39.64468 7.69 5.15 <0.0001 
P2 -53.9727 11.46 -4.71 0.0002 
Estimates of DA 
Change Year: Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
Five -177.87 -108.20 69.67 0.00 
Ten -21.65 -108.20 -86.75 0.00 
Fifteen -21.59 -108.20 -86.61 0.00 
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TABLE 11 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA ... - DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
:Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales . 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 57 115 117 120 123 · 126 130 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1212 1292 1318 1345 1372 1401 1429 
-0 NI 850 878 906 935 964 1051 1027 1059 1092 1125 1160 1195 0 
· Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7895 9192 10522 11885 13282 14714 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 509 465 477 489 501 514 526 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID ~250) ~500) _ ~750) (1000) (1250) · ~1500) ~1750~ (20001 !22501 (2500) !2750) (3000) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10588 11616 12676 13769 . 14895 16056 17252 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5583 6610 7669 8761 9886 11046 
Inc 850 878 906 935 · 964 1051 1027 1059 1092 1125 1160 1195 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10588 11616 12676 13769 14895 16056 17252 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1321 1297 1330 1363 1397 1432 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -182.39 -293.84 -238.37 -238.08 -237.78 -237.47 -237.16 
TABLE 11 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 5 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 133 136 140 143 147 150 154 158 162 . 166 170 
. Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1459 1489 1520 1552 1584 1618 1652 1687 1723 1760 1797 
....... 
0 NI 1231 1268 1306 1345 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 ....... 
Cash 16182 17687 19229 20810 22430 24091 25793 27538 29326 31159 33038 
NR 540 553 567 581 596 611 626 641 657 674 691 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 . 5022 
AID (3250) (3500) (3750) (4000) (4250) (4500) (4750) (5000) (5250) (5500) (5750) 
Assets . 18484 19753 21060 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 · 33001 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12241 13472 14740 16046 . 17391 18775 20201 21669 23179 24734 26333 
Inc 1231 1268 1306 1345 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 
L+OE 18484 19753 21060 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
CFO 1468 1505 1542 1581 1620 1661 1702 1745 1788 1833 1879 
Accruals -236.84 -236.51. -236.17 -235.83 -235.47 -235.11 -234.74 -234.36 -233.96 -233.56 -233.15 
TABLE 12 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 10 
0 1 2 3 . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
Comm.Exp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122 125 64 130 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 . 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1338 1429 
....... 
0 NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1222 1195 N 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14714 
NR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 576 526 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250) (500) (750) (1000) (1250) (1500) (1750) (2000) (2250) (2500) (2750) (3000) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16056 17252 
Contribution .5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 11046 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1222 1195 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16056 17252 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1494 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 · -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -173.51 -299.60 
TABLE 12 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 10 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 133 136 140 143 147 150 154 158 162 166 170 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1459 1489 1520 1552 1584 1618 1652 1687 1723 1760 1797 
..... ~ 0 
w NI 1231 1268 1306 1345 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 
Cash 16182 17687 19229 20810. 22430 24091 25793 27538 29326 31159 33038 
AIR 540 553 567 581 596 611 626 641 657 674 691 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 · • 5019 5020 5021 5022 
AID (3250) {3500) {3750} {4000} {4250} (4500} (4750) (5000) (5250) . (5500} (5750) 
Assets 18484 19753 21060 22406 23.791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12241 13472 14740 16046 17391 18775 20201 21669 23179 24734 26333 
Inc 1231 1268 1306 1345 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 
L+OE 18484 19753 21060 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
CFO 1468 1505 1542 1581 1620 1661 1702 1745 1788 1833 1879 
Accruals -236.84 -236.51 -236.17 -235.83 -235.47 -235.11 -234.74 -234.36 -233.96 -233.56 -233.15 
TABLE 13 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 13 
0 1 2 ,3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 113 116 119 122 125 128 i31 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 , 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1402 1431 
..... 
0 NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 ~ 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250} (500} (750) (1000) (1250) {1500) (1750) (2000} (2250} {2500} {2750) (3000) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
Contribution .5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 10982 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 ' 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -237.51 -237.20 
TABLE 13 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 13 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 - 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 69 140 143 147 150 154 158 162 166 170 
Depree. - 250 250 - 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1460 1422 1520 1552 1584 1618 1652 1687 1723 1760 1797 
-0 NI 1229 1335 1306 1345 - 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 VI 
Cash 16117 17619 19229 20810 22430 24091 25793 27538 29326 31159 33038 
AIR 538 620 567 581 596 611 - 626 641 657 674 691 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
ND {3250) (3500) {3750) (4000~ (4250) {4500) (4750~ (5000) (5250~ {5500) (5750~ 
Assets 18416 19753 21060 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12175 13404 14740 16046 17391 18775 20201 21669 23179 24734 26333' 
Inc 1229 1335 1306 1345 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 
L+OE 18416 19753. 21060 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 · 29754 31354 33001 
CFO 1466 1503 1609 1581 1620 1661 1702 1745 1788 1833 1879 
Accruals -236.88 -167.63 -303.42 -235.83 -235.47 -235.11 -234.74 -234.36 -233.96 -233.56 -233.15 
TABLE 14 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA - DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 15 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot.Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
Comm.Exp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 -113 116 119 122 125 128 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1402 1431 
-0 NI 850 · 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 ll24 1158 1193 0\ 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340. 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14650 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 512 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
ND {250} {500} . (750) (1000) {1250~ {1500} (1750) (2000) (2250) (2500) (2750) pOOO) 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571. 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 . 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 10982 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1158 1193 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 15992 17186 
CFO 1118 1145 1174 1203 1234 1264 1296 1328 1362 1396 1430 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239.75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 · -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -237.51 -237.20 
TABLE 14 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA -- DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE 
CHANGE IN YEAR 15 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 3359 3443 · 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 72 147 150 154. 158 162 166 170 . 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1460 1491 1522 1481 1584 1618 1652 1687 1723 1760 1797 
....... 
0 NI 1229 1266 1304 1416 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 ....J 
Cash 16117 17619 19160 20739 22430 24091 25793 27538 29326 31159 33038 
AIR 538 551 565 . 652 596 611 626 641 657 674 691 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 . 5019 5020 5021 5022 
AID (3250) {3500) p750) (4000) · (4250) · {4500) (4750} (5000) (5250} . (5500} (5750) 
Assets 18416 19684 20989 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12175 13404 14671 15975 17391 18775 20201 21669 23179 · 24734 26333 
Inc 1229 1266 1304 1416 1385 1426 1468 1510 1554 1600 1646 
L+OE 18416 19684 20989 22406 23791 25218 26687 28198 29754 31354 33001 
CFO 1466 1503 1540 1579 1691 1661 1702 1745 1788 · 1833 1879 
Accruals -236.88 -236.55 -236.21 -163.46 -306.12 -235.11 -234.74 -234.36 -233.96 -233.56 -233.15 
TABLE 15 
. Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effects of Discretionary Changes in the Bad Debt Expense in the Hypothetical Data 
Discretionary Change in the Estimates of Bad Debts in Years 5, 10, 13 and 15 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic p-value 
Bad Debt Chg. 
in Period 5 
a. 3,112.53918 107,335 0.03 0.98 
B1 0.54337 14.55 0.04 0.97 
B2 -0.67546 21.61 -0.03 0.98 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 10 
a. -10;353 59,115 -0.18 0.86 
B1 -1.16876 7.97 -0.15 0.89 
B2 2.03384 11.90 0.17 0.87 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 13 
a. -49,080 70,657 -0.69 0.50 
B1 -6.50618 9.74 -0.67 0.51 
B2 9.83070 14.23 0.69 0.50 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 15 
a. -28,804 54,345 -0.53 0.60 
B1 , -3.67736 7.42 -0.50 0.63 
B2 · 5.74807 10.94 0.53 0.61 
Estimates of DA 
BID Chg. Year: Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
Five· -233.99 -233.15 0.84 0.00 
Ten -237.21 -233.15 4.06 0.00 
Thirteen -256.61 -233.15 23.46 0.00 
Fifteen -246.02 -233.15 12.87 ·o.oo 
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TABLE 16 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA 
DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE AND DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
DISCRETIONARY BAD DEBT CHANGE IN YEAR 10 AND DISCRETIONARY DEPRECIATION CHANGE IN YEAR 12 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO 11 
Cash Sales 1500 1538 1576 1615 1656 1697 1740 1783 1828 1873 1920 1968 
Cr. Sales 500 513 525 538 552 566 580 594 609 624 640 656 
Tot. Rev. 2000 2050 2101 2154 2208 2263 2319 2377 2437 2498 2560 2624 
CommExp 800 820 841 862 883 905 928 951 975 999 1024 1050 
BID Expense 100 103 105 108 110 . 113 116 119 122 125 64 131 
Depree. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
1--' 
. 1150 1173 1196 1219 1243 1268 1294 1320 1347 1374 1338 1431 0 
\0 
NI 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1222 1193 
Cash 700 1818 2963 4137 5340 6574 7838 9134 10463 11824 13220 14714 
AIR 400 410 420 431 442 453 464 475 487 500 576 525 
PPE 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
AID (250} !500) {750} (1000) ~1250) (1500) (1750) (2000) (2250) (2500) (2750) (3000} 
Assets 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16056 17250 
Contribution 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 
R/E 0 850 1728 2633 3568 4532 5527 6552 7610 8700 9824 11046 
Inc 850 878 906 935 964 995 1026 1058 1090 1124 1222 1193 
L+OE 5850 6729 7635 8571 9536 10532 11558 12617 13708 14833 16056 17250 
CFO 1118 1145 il74 1203 1234 1264 1296 . · 1328 1362 1396 1494 
Accruals 150.00 -240.00 -239:75 -239.49 -239.23 -238.96 -238.69 -238.40 -238.11 -237.82 -173.51 -301.20 
TABLE 16 (CONTINUED) 
HYPOTHETICAL DATA 
DISCRETIONARY CHANGE IN BAD DEBT EXPENSE AND DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
DISCRETIONARY BAD DEBT CHANGE IN YEAR 10 AND DISCRETIONARY DEPRECIATION CHANGE IN YEAR 12 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Cash Sales 2017 2068 2119 2172 2227 2282 2339 2398. 2458 2519 2582 
Cr. Sales 672 689 706 724 742 761 780 799 819. 840 861 
Tot. Rev. 2690 2757 2826 2897 2969 3043 3119 3197 3277 . 3359 3443 
CommExp 1076 1103 1130 1159 1188. 1217 1248 1279 1311 1344 1377 
BID Expense 134 138 141 145 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 
Depree. 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
..... 1335 1366 1397 1428 1461 1494 1529 1564 1600. 1637 1674 ..... 
0 
NI 1354 1391 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
Cash 16181 17683 19224 20803 22421 24080 25781 27524 29310 31141 33018 
AfR 538 551 565 579 594 609 624 639 655 672 689 
PPE 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
AID pl25} (3250) (3375} (3500} p625} p750) (3875} ~4000) ~4125) (4250) (4375) 
Assets 18605 19998 21428 22897 24406 25956 27548 29182 30861 32584 34354 
Contribution 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 
R/E 12239 13593 14985 16414 17882 19390 20939 22530 24163 25841 27563 · 
Inc 1354 . 1391 1429 1468 1508 1549 1591 1634 1677 1723 1769 
L+OE 18605 19998 21428 22897 24406 25956 27548 29182 30861 32584 34354 
·CFO i466 1503 1540 1579 1618 1659 1700 1743 1786 1831 1877 
Accruals -111.88 -111.55 -111.21 -110.87 -110.52 · -110.15 -109.78 -109.40 -109.01 -108.61 -108.20 
Cl 
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TABLE17 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effect of Discretionary Accrual Changes in the, Hypothetical Data 
Discretionary Change in Bad Debt Expense in Year 10 and 
Discretionary Change in Depreciation Expense in Year 12 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates ... Deviation t-statistic p-value 
198,108 102,195 1.94 0.07 
31.83113 13.81 2.31 0.03 
-39.98036 20.57 -1.94 0.07 
-
Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual 
DA 
-0.19 -108.20 -108.01 0.00 
111 
TABLE 18 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effects of Discretionary Depreciation Changes in the Hypothetical Data Set With 
N onstationary Periods Removed by TIMV AR 
Discretionary Depreciation Changes in Years 5, 10 and 15 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic P-:-value 
Depree. Change 
in Period 5 
a -54.12128 17.67644 -3.06 0.0099 
~1 0.20882 0.00217 96.03 < 0.0001 
~2 -0.01426 0.00356 -4.01 0.0017 
Depree. Change 
in Period 10 
a -14.1545 10.51 -1.35 0.22 
B1 0.21267 0.00125 170.50 < 0.0001 
~2 -0.02228 0.002 -10.55 < 0.0001 
Peprec. Change 
in Period 15 
a 12.55 4.57 I 2.75 0.1109 
B1 0.2143 0.0005 465.04 < 0.0001 
~2 -0.02763 0.0009 -30.11 0.0011 
Estimates ofDA 
Change Year: Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
Five -108.20 -108.20 0.00 0.00 
Ten -108.18 -108.20 -0.02 0.00 
Fifteen -108.20 -108.20 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE 19 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effects of Discretionary Changes in the Bad Debt Expense in the Hypothetical Data 
N onstationary Periods Removed By TIMV AR 
Discretionary Changes in the Estimates of Bad Debts in Years 5, 10, 13 and 15 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic p-value 
Bad Debt Chg. 
in Period 5 
a -88.4775 48.61 -1.82 0;096 
B1 0.2198 0.0062 35.46 < 0.0001 
B2 -0.0325 0.0098 -3.32 0.0068 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 10 
a 23,307 63,301 0.37 0.72 
B1 3.3678 8.58 0.39 0.70 
~2 -4.7418 12.74 -0.37 0.71 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 13 
a · -12.68 33.72 -0.38 0.72 
B1 0.2258 0.0036 62.72 < 0.0001 
~2 -0.0477 0.0068 -7.04 0.0009 
Bad Debt Chg. in 
Period 15 
a -198,414 166,658 -1.19 0.35 
B1 -16.3059 21.07 -0.77 0.35 
~2 39.73513 33.53 1.19 0.35 
Estimates ofDA 
BID Chg. Year: Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
Five -233.13 -233.15 -0.02 0.00 
Ten -233.14 -233.15 -0.01 0.00 
Thirteen -248.89 -233.15 15.74 0.00 
Fifteen -233.54 -233.15 0.39 0.00 
113 
a. 
~. 
f32 
TABLE20 
Coefficient Estimates and Error Analysis 
Effect of Discretionary Accrual Changes in the Hypothetical Data 
Nonstationary Periods Removed by TIMVAR 
Discretionary Change in Bad Debt Expense in Year 10 and 
Discretionary Change in Depreciation in Year 12 
Coefficient Standard 
Variable Estimates Deviation t-statistic p-value 
-8.4622 10.11 -0.84 0.43 
0.2131 0,.0012 174.29 <0.0001 
-0.02342 0.0020 -11.52 <0.0001 
Predicted TA Actual TA Est. ofDA Actual DA 
-108.19 -108.20 -0.01 0.00 
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Table 21 
Parameter Estimates for the Jones Model and the Stationary Jones Model 
Models with 2 and 4 year test periods using 762 firms 
ACCRiJAssetSit-1 = a. i(l/ AssetSit-1) + ~1i(~ViJ AssetSit-1) + ~2i(PPfatl AssetSit-1) (2) 
Panel A: Jones and Stationary Jones Models Estimated With 2-Year Test:Period 
Coefficient Standard 
Estimates 
Jones Model 
a 
b1 
b2 
Stationary 
Jones Model 
a 
b1 
b2 
Mean 
11.4690 
0.0875 
-0.1456 
-65.0520 
0.0667 
-0.1099 
Deviation 
115 
369.8463 
0.2268 
0.3957 
432.50(j9 
0.3139 
0.9438 
TABLE 21 ( continued) 
Parameter Estimates for the Jones Model and the Stationary Jones Model 
Models with 2 and 4 year test periods using 762 firms 
Panel B: Jones and Stationary Jones Models Estimated With 4-Year Test Period 
Coefficient Standard 
Estimates 
Jones Model 
a 
b1 
b2 
·Stationary 
Jones Model 
a 
b1 
b2. 
Mean 
21.8486 
0.0892 
-0.1500 
-57.4121 
0.1128 
-0.1546 
Deviation 
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308.5313 
0.2132 
0.4123 
474.6473 
0.5489 
0.9931 
TABLE22 
Forecast Accuracy of the Jones (1991) Model and the Stationary Jones Model 
Models estimated over 16 and 14 years using 762 firms 
Panel A: Distributional Statistics for Forecast Errors 
Model Estimated Over 16 Years 
Std. Percentiles 
Model Mean Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
Jones Model -0.0089 0.1259 -0.1329 -0.0573 -0.0083 0.0413 0.1046 
Stationary Jones -0.0016 0.1110 -0.1095 -0.0451 0.0015 0.0493 0.0989 
Model Estimated Over 14 Years 
Std. Percentiles 
Model Mean Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
Jones Model -0.0822 0.1738 -0.1979 -0.1257 -0.0749 .-0.0210 0.0347 
Stationary Jones -0.0442 0.1091 -0.0685 -0.0139 0.0478 0.1042 0.1557 
Panel B: Percent of Times Each Model Has Lowest Sum of Squared Forecast Errors 
(SSFE) 
Model Estimated Over 16 Years 
Model 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
Lowest SSFE 
45.44% 
54.56% 
Highest SSFE 
54.56% 
45.44% 
Model Estimated Over 14 Years 
Model 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
Lowest SSFE Highest SSFE 
31.80% 68.20% 
68.20% 31.80% 
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Table 22 (continued) 
Forecast Accuracy of the Jones (1991) Model and the Stationary Jones Model 
Models estimated over 16 and 14 years using 762 firms 
Panel C: Distribution of Firm-Specific Explained Variation 
R2 :;:: 1 - ESS/TSS 
where: 
ESS :;:: I(~ctual - forecast)2 
TSS :;:: I(actual - mean)2 
Model Estimated Over 16 Years 
Model Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Percentiles 
25th Median 75th . 90th 
Jones Model -9.9837 72.2333 -l~.5113 -2.7354 0.0382 0.7818 0.9528 
Stationary Jones -4.0895 34.8688 -5.0239 -1.7540 0.2322 0.8108 0.9788 
Percent With Positive R 2 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
51.00% 
62.00% 
Model Estimated Over 14 Years 
Model Mean 
Jones Model -1.2592 
Stationary Jones 0.5103 
Percent With Positive R2 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
Std. 
Dev. 10th 
Percentiles 
25th Median 
5.5898 -4.2221 -1.1088 0.2691 0.7617 0.9070 
0.4889 -0.1592 0.1143 - 0.6856 0.9536 0.9948 
57.00% 
79.00% 
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Table 22 (continued) 
Forecast Accuracy of the Jones (1991) Model and the Stationary Jones Model 
Models estimated over 16 and 14 years using 762 firms 
Panel D: Distribution of Firm-Specific Explained Variation, Relative to Narve Model of 
Forecast Accrual of -5% of Assets 
R2 = 1 -ESS/TSS 
where: 
ESS = I;(actual -forecast)2 
TSS = Z:(actual-(-5%*Assets))2 
Model Estimated Over 16 Years 
Percentiles 
Model Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
0.9815 
0.9888 
Percent With Positive R 2 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
0.3852 0.9986 0.9999 
0.0967 0.9967 0.9999 
100.00% 
. 100.00% 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Model Estimated Over 14 Years 
Model 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
Mean 
0.9954 
0.9966 
Percent With Positive R2 
Jones Model 
Stationary Jones 
Percentiles Std. 
Dev. 10th 25th Median 75th 
0.0308 0.9981 0.9999 
0.0414 0.9995 1.0000 
100.00% 
100.00% 
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1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
TABLE23 
Nonlinear Generalized Least Squares Estimation (the Mishkin (1983) Test) of the 
Market Pricing of Cash from Operations, Nondiscretionary Accruals and 
Discretionary Accruals with Respect to Their Implications for One-Year-Ahead 
Earnings 
Panel A: Market Pricing of Earnings Components with Respect to Their Implications for 
One-Year-Ahead Earnings · · 
EARNt+1 =Yo+ y1CFOt + y2NDAt + y3DAt + Yt+I (16) 
SIZEAJRt+I =a.+ P(EARNt+I -yo -y\CFOt - y\NDAt - y*3DAt) + Et+Ia (17) 
Jones Model 
Forecasting Coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
YI (CFO) 
Y2 (NDA) 
y3{DA) 
.94 
.22 
.38 
Stationary Jones Model 
.108 
.052 
.086 
. Forecasting Coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
YI (CFO) 
Y2 (NDA) 
y3 (DA) 
.43 
.64 
.46 
.234 
.309 
.301 
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Valuation Coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
y*I (CFO) 
y*2 (NDA) 
y*3 (DA) 
.82 
.46 
.68 
.350 
.201 
.238 
Valuation Coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
y*l (CFO) 
y*2 (NDA) 
y*3 (DA) 
.39 
.64 
.47 
.157 
.254 
.272 
TABLE 23 (continued) 
Nonlinear Generalized Least Squares.Estimation (the Mishkin (1983) Test) of the 
Market Pricing of Cash from Operations, N ondiscretionary Accruals and 
Discretionary Accruals with Respect to Their Implications for One-Year-Ahead 
Earnings 
Panel B: Tests of Rational Pricing of Earnings Components· 
Jones Model 
Null Hypothesis 
CFO: 1*1 = 'YI 
NDA: 1*2 = 12 
DA: y*3 = 'Y3 
NDA, DA: 1*2 = 12 & y*3 ::::: 13 
CFO, NDA, DA: 1*1 = 11 & 1*2 = 12 & 1*3 = 'Y3 
Stationary Jones Model 
Null Hypothesis 
CFO: 1*1 = 'YI 
NDA: 1*2 = 12 
DA: y*3 = 'Y3 
NDA, DA: 1*2 = 'Y2 & y*3 = "(3 
CFO, NDA, DA: 1*1 = 'YI & 1*2 = 12 & y*3 = 'Y3 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Statistic 
0.63b 
3.11 
10.58 
15.91 
16.40 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Statistic-
0.99 
1.51 
2.10 
2.13 
2.13 
Significance 
Level 
p=0.42 
p=0.08 
p=0.001 
p=0.0004 
p=0.0009 
. Significance 
Level 
p=0.32 
p=0.22 
p=0.15 
p=0.35 
p=0.55 
a Equations (xa) and (xb) are jointly estimated using an iterative generalized nonlinear 
least squares estimation procedure based on 1,776 observations during 1998-2001. 
b 2NLn(SSRc/SSRu) = 2 * 1,776 * Ln(l,691.4/1,691.1) = 0.63. 
The variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE24 
Hedge Portfolio Results For Stationary Jones Model versus Jones (1991) Model 
Models Estimated Over 16 Years With Longest Stationary Period Prior To Test 
Period Used for Stationary Jones Model 
Portfolio Jones Model Stationary Jones Model 
Ranka t + 1 t+2 t+l t+ 2 
Low 0.103 0.112 0.113 0.035 
(1.78) ** (1. 70) * (1.59) * (0.59) · 
2 0.340 -0.117 0.093 0.042 
(4.03) ** (-2.72) ** (1.65) ** (0.69) 
3 0.206 0.108 0.295 -0.043 
(3.37) ** (1. 78) ** (3.71) ** (-0.90) 
4 0.211 -0.008 0.179 0.121 
(3.22) ** (-0.15) (4.20) ** (1.83) ** 
5 0.160 0.030 0.112 0.255 
(2.87) ** (0.63) (1.62) * (3.79) **· 
6 0.104 0.080 0.122 -0.062 
(2.27) ** (1.29) * (2.82) ** (-1.26) 
7 0.041 0.096 0.086 0.093 
(0.90) (1.36) * (1.80) ** (2.02) ** 
8 0.132 0.084 0.168 0.090 
(1.97) ** (1.97) ** (2.45) ** (1.48) * 
9 0.062 0.091 0.100 -0.055 
(1.41)_ * (1.47) * (2.13) ** (-1.26) 
Hi h g -0.001 -0.053 0.076 -0.043 
(-0.11) .. (-1.10) (1.21) (-0.81) 
Hedge 0.105 0.165 0.038 0.078 
(1.77) * (2.02) ** (0.46) (0.97) 
N 1,132 566 1,132 566 
* and ** denote significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 level, respectively, based on a one-tailed t-test for the test 
period (2 years) of annual portfolio abnormal returns. 
a Portfolio deciles are formed annually based on the ranking of discretionary accruals. The hedge portfolio 
is formed by taking a long position in the lowest decile portfolio and a short position in the highest decile 
portfolio based on discretionary accruals. 
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TABLE25 
Hedge Portfolio Results For Stationary Jones Model versus Jones (1991) Model 
Models Estimated Over 14 Years With Longest Stationary Period Prior To Test 
Period Used for Stationary Jones Model 
Portfolio Jones Model Stationary Jones Model 
Ranka t+l t+2 t+3 t + 1 t+2. t+3 
Low 0.054 0.022 0.093 0.000 0.027 0.097 
(1.80) ** (0.22) (0.92) (0.00) (0.24) (1,37) * 
2 0.176 -0.075 0.162 -0.094 0.048 0.224 
(2.34) ** (-0.85) (2.00) ** (-1.25) (0.48) (2.23) ** 
3 0.093 0.020 0.172 -0.012 0.035 0.139 
(1.21) (0~21) (2.33) ** (-0.16) (0.44) (1.46) * 
4 -0.019 0.066 0.041 -0.009 -0.012 0.175 
(-0.28) (0.84) (0.71) (-0.14) (-0.18) (2.44) ** 
5 0.062 -0.012 0.211 0.012 0.017 0.167 
(0.85) (-0.17) (2.72) ** (0.16) (0.22) (2.27) ** 
6 -0.093 -0.022 0.181 0.027 0.068 0.160 
(-0.82) (-0.34) (3.57) ** (0.24) (0.59) (2.08) ** 
7 -0.035 0.107 0.121 -0.007 0.021 0.113 
(-0.44) (1.10) (1.54) * (-0.09) (0.27) (1.63) * 
8 -0.077 0.066 0.154 -0.003 -0.014 0.139 
(-1.21) (0.59) (2.04) ** (-0.05) (-0.21) (2.18) ** 
9 -0.149 -0.032 0.194 -0.002 -0.038 0.107 
(-2.25) ** (-0.49) (2.18) ** (-0.02) (-0.~0) (1.68) ** 
High -0.115 0.023 . 0.140 -0.025 0.017 O.i31 
(-1.71) * (0.21) (1.50) * (-0.31) (0.15) (1.39) * 
Hedge 0.169 -0.001 -0.048 0.026 0.010 -0.033 
{2.32) ** (-0.01) (-0.35) (0.19) (0.06) (-0.28) 
N 2,372 1,779 1,186 2,372 1,779 1,186 
* and ** denote significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 level, respectively, based on a one-tailed t-te~t for the test 
period (2 years) of annual portfolio abnormal returns. 
a Portfolio deciles are formed annually based on the ranking of discretionary accruals. 
The hedge portfolio is formed by taking a long position in the lowest decile portfolio and 
a short position in the highest decile. portfolio based on discretionary accruals. 
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